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“Criminals, it turns out, are the one social group in America we
have permission to hate.”
– Michelle Alexander1
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INTRODUCTION
In May of 2015, Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New
York expunged the conviction of Jane Doe,2 a low-income mother of
four, who had been sentenced to five years of probation more than a
decade earlier for her involvement in an insurance fraud scheme.3 At
the time of her conviction Doe was working as a home health aide.
Her criminal record had since made it impossible to find new work in

2. A pseudonym.
3. See Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also
Ronald F. Day, Crime and Incarceration: A Future Fraught With Uncertainty, in
IMPACT: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE THREAT OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 1, 36 (July
2015),
http://www.nyls.edu/impact-center-for-public-interest-law/publications/
[https://perma.cc/34TN-5XHV].
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her field.4 In his decision, Judge Gleeson wrote, “I sentenced her to
five years of probation supervision, not to a lifetime of
unemployment.”5 In order to make the punishment fit the crime, the
judge felt it necessary to erase the record of the crime ever
happening.
There are over seventy million people in the U.S. with a criminal
record on file.6 Prison reformers have dubbed the criminal record
“the mark of Cain” because of its indelible nature and its role as a
justification for perpetual punishment—namely, exclusion from the
economic and social spheres of American life.7 This punishment is
exacerbated by racial prejudice and the real and perceived
connections between race and criminal justice involvement in this
country.8 Jane Doe is black and, in the decision, Judge Gleeson
acknowledged her race as “even more of an impediment to her

4. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 449-52. The order was vacated and remanded by
the Court of Appeals due to lack of jurisdiction. Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192
(2016), cert. denied, No. 16-876, 2017 WL 120912 (May 22, 2017).
5. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 457.
6. According to a 2012 Department of Justice report, 100.5 million Americans
have state criminal history records on file. The National Employment Law Project
(“NELP”), an advocacy group, has been skeptical of the DOJ’s statistics in the past,
contending that they are likely an overestimate because they may not account for
individuals who have records in multiple states. Thus, NELP has suggested reducing
the DOJ figures by a generous thirty percent, which—while almost certainly leading
to an underestimate—still yields a count of 70.3 million individuals with criminal
records. For the DOJ data, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2012 (Jan. 2014), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
bjs/grants/244563.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J2V-4FAT]. For a discussion of NELP’s
methodology that yields a more conservative estimate using 2008 data, see MICHELLE
NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT, 65
MILLION ‘NEED NOT APPLY:’ THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT (2011), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/65_
Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMF8-PRX5]. It is important to
note that a conviction is not a criminal record prerequisite. A record is created upon
arrest, regardless of the ultimate disposition. See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL
CRIMINAL RECORD 1 (2015).
7. See Webb Hubbell, The Mark of Cain, SFGATE (June 10, 2001 4:00 AM),
http://sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-mark-of-Cain-2910287.php
[https://perma.cc/A7GL-EPXX].
For a comprehensive study of collateral
consequences, see generally JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT:
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006).
8. See infra Parts I-II; see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 86-100 (2007) [hereinafter
MARKED]; Sarah Childress, Michelle Alexander: “A System of Racial and Social
Control,” PBS: FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/
article/michelle-alexander-a-system-of-racial-and-social-control/
[https://perma.cc/3PM8-LWX7].
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employment prospects than her conviction.”9 In the U.S. job market,
race has effectively become a proxy for criminality.10
Sociologists have begun to draw attention to the racial disparities
in both the population “marked” by a criminal record and the civic
penalties inflicted on that population upon reentry into society.11
Studies show that the criminal justice system acts as a manufacturer of
inequality in the labor market.12 The system disproportionately
convicts and incarcerates people of color and then tracks them for
further disparate treatment by potential employers, frequently driving
these individuals to abandon the prospect of a legal job altogether.13
This authorized cycle of discrimination has, in turn, engendered and
solidified social biases about what criminality looks like.14 Today, the
unemployment rate of people with criminal records generally is
dangerously high,15 but specific attention needs to be paid to the
unmeasured group of unemployed people of color with criminal
records.
As the successful reintegration of the ex-offender population
becomes an increasingly urgent policy concern, more and more states,
cities, and counties are implementing “ban-the-box” hiring laws to
improve the employment outcomes of people with criminal records.16
Ban-the-box laws aim to provide job candidates with the opportunity
to put forward their qualifications initially without the stigma of a
criminal record by prohibiting the conviction history question on
preliminary job application materials and to delay the moment at
which an employer can perform a criminal background check.17 Banthe-box legislation is important because it addresses the issue of
discrimination based on criminal background.18 However, given the
concerns over the specific and intensified discrimination faced by
unemployed people of color with criminal records, more targeted
legislation is needed. Otherwise, the question of how effective ban-

See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 452.
See MARKED, supra note 7, at 95; see also infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See Pager, infra note 29.
See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See Michelle N. Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities,
Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies, NELP (Apr. 1, 2017),
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide/
[https://perma.cc/6PY6-C9YH].
17. Id.
18. Id.
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the-box legislation is in terms of benefitting minority groups who are
most disenfranchised by the criminal justice system and its collateral
consequences remains.19 This Note argues that there have been
insufficient data collection efforts to establish and ensure that banthe-box legislation will specifically improve the employment
outcomes of people of color with criminal records. Further, the laws
should be written with the explicit purpose of ameliorating the
collateral consequences of conviction for minorities in order to
distinguish the future of ban-the-box legislation from past failures in
antidiscrimination jurisprudence.20
Part I of this Note explains how criminal records currently operate
to exclude people—particularly people of color—from the labor
market. Part II catalogs the history of laws aimed to remedy the
unequal impact of criminal record discrimination on people of color
and the context that led to the ban-the-box movement. Part II also
outlines competing sociological theories about whether or not banthe-box laws will increase employment outcomes for people of color
with criminal records, framed by a critical race theory analysis of the
civil rights law tradition. Part III presents the limited existing data
about the effects of ban-the-box legislation and suggests a more
robust legislative model that will guide and enforce future, useful data
collection.
I. WHY ARE GOVERNMENTS BANNING THE BOX?
A. Criminal Records in the Labor Market
Over the past few decades there has been a deliberate “redrawing”
of American social inequality, influenced and characterized by the
dramatic rise in the prison and jail populations.21 Sociologists Bruce
Western and Becky Pettit explain that, although the increase in the
penal confinement rate is in itself a significant and sinister social
phenomenon, “the scale of punishment today gains its social force
from its unequal distribution.”22 People of color—particularly young
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part II.
21. Bruce Western & Becky Petit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139
DAEDALUS 8, 16 (2010), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_
a_00019 [https://perma.cc/T3NZ-R8ME].
22. Id. at 8-9. The intensity and scope of the inequality in the criminal justice
system cannot be overstated. Western and Petit argue that this inequality is at once
“invisible,” “cumulative,” and “intergenerational.” It is invisible because it operates
on populations that typically lie outside official accounts of economic well being, like
census data. It is cumulative because the collateral consequences of incarceration are
“accrued” by those who are already on the lowest rungs of the opportunity structure.
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black men—make up a disproportionate share of the Americans
behind bars.23 Black people constitute just thirteen percent of the
overall population but forty percent of the prison population.24
Latinos constitute sixteen percent of the American population,
relative to nineteen percent of the prison population.25 Alarmingly,

Finally, it is intergenerational because it impacts not just incarcerated or previously
incarcerated people but also their families and communities. Id. at 8, 12-14.
23. According to a 2014 Bureau of Justices Statistics Report:
black males had higher imprisonment rates than prisoners of other races or
Hispanic origin within every age group. Imprisonment rates for black males
were 3.8 to 10.5 times greater at each age group than white males and 1.4 to
3.1 times greater than rates for Hispanic males. The largest disparity
between white and black male prisoners occurred among incarcerated
people ages 18 to 19. Black males (1,072 prisoners per 100,000 black male
residents ages 18 to 19) were more than 10 times more likely to be in state
or federal prison than whites (102 per 100,000).
E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2014, 15
(Sept. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R8FU6JF]. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) uses race and “Hispanic origin”
distributions from its 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional
Facilities to adjust the administrative data from National Prisoner Statistics to reflect
self-identification of race and “Hispanic origin.” See id. BJS uses the ethnonym
“Hispanic” (rather than “Latino,” used in this paper) to refer to a person of Cuban,
Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or
origin regardless of race. See id. Further, black people constitute thirty percent of
arrestees and forty-five percent of persons convicted of crimes. See SENTENCING
PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22
(2008),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracial
disparity.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK4H-7A7J]. While the population of incarcerated
blacks is overwhelmingly male (over ninety percent) black women are also
incarcerated at a higher rate than their white counterparts. For more information
about the racial makeup of women behind bars, see MARC MAUER, SENTENCING
PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF WOMEN’S INCARCERATION 1 (Feb.
2013), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-changing-racial-dynamicsof-womens-incarceration/ [https://perma.cc/KUT8-XCTG].
Black transgender
people and gender non-conforming people are incarcerated at the highest rate of all.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., A BLUEPRINT FOR EQUALITY: PRISON
AND DETENTION REFORM (2012), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/
docs/resources/NCTE_Blueprint_for_Equality2012_Prison_Reform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UX22-5C46]. Nearly forty-seven percent of black transgender
people are incarcerated at some point during their lifetime. See id.
24. LEAH SAKALA, BREAKING DOWN MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 2010 CENSUS:
STATE-BY-STATE INCARCERATE RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY (May 2014),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/32LR-A46V] (using
2010 Census data); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS: UNITED STATES
(2010),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045214/00
[https://perma.cc/
WS3Z-ME26] (corresponding census data). More up to date federal prison race and
ethnicity statistics are available at FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Inmate Statistics (Mar.
2017), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp [https://perma.
cc/SZU6-8TH7].
25. See SAKALA supra note 24; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU supra note 24.
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the Justice Department has estimated that one third of black men and
nearly a fifth of Latino men born in 2001 will go to prison in their
lifetime.26 Prejudiced criminal justice policies and racial profiling, not
disproportionate minority crime rates, account for the high numbers
of blacks and Latinos locked up.27 Only very recently have
researchers begun to take stock of the impact of the intense racial
disparities in the incarcerated population on the myriad collateral
consequences that population suffers upon release.28 According to
Sociologist Devah Pager, who implemented an experiment in 2003 to
test the role of criminal records in hiring discrimination, “the
connections are in thinking about the criminal justice system as an
increasingly important mechanism for generating racial inequality in
the labor market.”29 Pager’s experiment highlighted the correlation

26. Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the US Population, 19742001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7ZH-BH6Y].
27. See Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box But Keeping The Discrimination?:
Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 199 (2014). This point is best demonstrated through
the disparate treatment of people of color in the war on drugs. A June 2013 report
by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) found that although white and
black Americans use marijuana at similar rates, a black person was nearly four times
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a white person across all
states (in the states with the worst disparities, blacks were on average over six times
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than whites). See ACLU, THE
WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON
RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 9, 17, 21 (June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/report/reportwar-marijuana-black-and-white [https://perma.cc/4WB4-G3TW]; see also NAZGOL
GHANDNOOSH, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT:
RACIAL
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES (2014),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Race-andPunishment.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNT9-EBYS] (explaining how the war on drugs
and overt racial bias in policing leads to disproportionate arrests and convictions of
people of color). For a detailed explanation of how the real and perceived
intersections between race and criminality in the U.S. developed, see generally
KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2011).
28. Michelle Alexander is famous for describing this phenomenon as the “new
Jim Crow” in her 2010 book. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 1.
29. Kai Wright, Boxed In: How a Criminal Record Keeps You Unemployed For
Life, NATION (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/boxed-how-criminalrecord-keeps-you-unemployed-life/ [https://perma.cc/67BV-PPA9] (quoting Devah
Pager). Pager writes in her study, “No longer a peripheral institution, the criminal
justice system has become a dominant presence in the lives of young disadvantaged
men, playing a key role in the sorting and stratifying of labor market opportunities.”
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 962 (Mar. 2003),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/Reference%20Media/Pager_2003_Crime%2
0and%20the%20Legal%20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT4M-KZ2D]. Bruce Western
and Kathryn Beckett have also called the criminal justice system a “labor market
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between the disparate treatment of race by the criminal justice system
and the later disparate treatment of race by employers evaluating job
applicants with records.30
Pager refers to a person’s criminal record as a “negative credential”
because of the extremely high barrier it poses to employment.31 Her
study used an experimental audit approach based on “matched pairs”
of specially trained black and white men who applied for hundreds of
entry-level, low-wage jobs in Milwaukee in the summer of 2001.32
The applicants were randomly assigned resumes that showed identical
work experience and education, but one of the two indicated recent
employment in prison and listed a parole officer as a reference.33
Pager recorded whether employers called back to offer a job or
schedule a second-round interview. The study’s aim was to determine
the extent to which a criminal record (in the absence of other
disqualifying characteristics) serves as an obstacle to employment.
Out of the pool of subjects, thirty-four percent of white applicants
without a criminal record were given a callback compared to
seventeen percent of white applicants with a criminal record.34 That
is, having a criminal record reduced a white job applicant’s success by
half.35 Even more alarming, was that the seventeen percent of white
applicants with criminal records given callbacks was still higher than
the fourteen percent of black applicants without criminal records who
were given callbacks.36 And only a meager five percent of black
applicants with criminal records were given callbacks.37 Therefore,
the study revealed even greater racial discrimination in hiring

institution.” See Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated is the U.S.
Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 AM. J. SOC.
1030,
1052
(Jan.
1999),
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4756/western.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LJG-PFY7].
30. Pager, supra note 29, at 956.
31. Id. at 942. Pager identifies the “credentialing” power of the criminal justice
system, which operates by institutionally branding a particular class of individuals
“with implications for their perceived place in the stratification order.” Id.
32. Id. at 945-46.
33. All the applicants were twenty-three-year-old college students who were
matched on the basis of physical appearance and general style of self-presentation.
Id. at 947. The applicant posing as a previously incarcerated person disclosed in the
interview that he had served an eighteen-month prison term for a drug crime. Id. at
959.
34. Id. at 955.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 958.
37. Id. Pager’s study shows that a criminal record halved a white applicant’s
chances, but reduced a black applicant’s chance by two-thirds. In other words,
criminal records hurt black candidates more than white candidates.
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practices than conviction-based discrimination.
Responding to
Pager’s findings, Ta-Nehisi Coates wrote: “Effectively, the job
market in America regards black men who have never been criminals
as though they were.”38 This pervasive prejudice among hiring
authorities is tied up in stereotypes of criminality that assume39—and
ultimately, contribute to40—links between race and ex-offender
status.
In most jurisdictions the social stigma associated with a criminal
record is compounded by legally mandated discrimination based on
that criminal record.41 People with certain past criminal justice
involvement are excluded by law—temporarily or permanently—
from a variety of jobs in the public and private sectors, running the
gamut from ambulance drivers to septic tank cleaners.42 Further,
even when discrimination is not legally required, most states allow
employers and occupational licensing agencies to obtain the full
criminal records of job applicants and to use that information in
hiring at their discretion.43
Pager explains that the criminal record as a source of labor market
inequality is so nefarious because it is a mechanism of discrimination
and social exclusion that is sanctioned and designed by the state.44
Employment satisfies a basic and fundamental need for a human to

38. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/theblack-family-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/
[https://perma.cc/Y4885ANC].
39. See GHANDNOOSH, supra note 27, at 3 (“White Americans overestimate the
proportion of crime committed by people of color, and associate people of color with
criminality. For example, white respondents in a 2010 survey overestimated the
actual share of burglaries, illegal drug sales, and juvenile crime committed by African
Americans by 20-30%. In addition, implicit bias research has uncovered widespread
and deep-seated tendencies among whites—including criminal justice practitioners—
to associate blacks and Latinos with criminality.”).
40. See infra note 48.
41. See infra Section II.A.2.
42. See infra Section II.A.2; see also Bruce E. May, The Character Component of

Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment
Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 190 (1995).
43. See infra Section II.A.3.
44. Pager, supra note 29, at 942 (“The ‘negative credential’ associated with a

criminal record represents a unique mechanism of stratification, in that it is the state
that certifies particular individuals in ways that qualify them for discrimination or
social exclusion. It is this official status of the negative credential that differentiates it
from other sources of social stigma, offering greater legitimacy to its use as the basis
for differentiation.”).
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be self-sufficient and contribute to society at large.45 For that reason,
it has been shown to be a person’s primary concern upon release from
incarceration.46 But time behind bars impedes the accumulation of
work experience, prevents the maintenance of social networks that
aid in job searches, and tends to lead to the erosion of marketable
skills, on top of qualifying individuals for discrimination and social
exclusion.47 The significant barrier to the legal labor market posed by
a criminal record frequently pushes previously convicted people to
find alternative sources of income, often outside of the law.48 These
alternative income sources include a shadow economy of part time
labor—similar to the one that exploits undocumented workers—that
provides low wages with little if any benefits, putting strain on
laborers and the families they support.49 Pager writes “in our frenzy
of locking people up, our ‘crime control’ policies may in fact
exacerbate the very conditions that led to crime in the first place.”50
Unsurprisingly, deprivation of stable work is one of the strongest
predictors of recidivism.51
45. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 148. Inability to find work can lead to
behavioral and mental health effects like depression and proclivity for violence,
particularly among men. Id. at 149.
46. MARTA NELSON, PERRY DEESS & CHARLOTTE ALLEN, VERA INST., THE FIRST
MONTH OUT: POST-INCARCERATION EXPERIENCES IN NEW YORK CITY 13 (Sept.
1999),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/first_month_
out.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRM6-2B67].
47. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 4, 22-23 (2003).
48. This is partially due to the fact that a criminal record often adds to the already
“problematic profile” of an applicant who has little or no preparation for the
workforce. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 150. Poverty, limited education, mental
illness, and addiction are all factors that increase a person’s risk of ending up behind
bars. See id. According to one study, nearly half of the offender and ex-offender
populations are functionally illiterate. See id. (citing JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY SOLOMON
& MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF PRISONER REENTRY (2001)).
49. See generally MERCER L. SULLIVAN, “GETTING PAID:” YOUTH CRIME AND
WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989); Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on
Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526 (Aug. 2002); see also Wright,
supra note 29. A 2010 Pew Charitable Trust study found that for men, having been
incarcerated reduces hourly wages by eleven percent and reduces annual earnings by
forty percent. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S
EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/reports/0001/01/01/collateral-costs [https://perma.cc/NJ2Y-EU4Q].
50. Pager, supra note 29, at 961.
51. Id. at 939; see Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Huebner, Reentry and the Ties That
Bind: An Examination of Social Ties, Employment, and Recidivism , 28 JUST. Q. 382,
398 (Apr. 2011), http://www.pacific-gateway.org/reentry,%20employment%20and%20
recidivism.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TMZ-DZ5C] (showing that two years after release
ex-offenders who were employed were nearly half as likely to face arrest or
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Hiring discrimination against people with criminal records,
concentrated in minority communities, has led to rampant joblessness
with profound effects on the U.S. economy and social welfare.
Neither the Federal Bureau of Prisons, nor the Department of Labor,
nor any state or federal prison tracks the unemployment rate of exoffenders, but studies have estimated that it is between twenty-five
and forty percent.52 Estimates of lost productivity due to joblessness
and the post-conviction, secondary labor market total as much as
sixty-five billion dollars per year in terms of gross domestic product
(not including the high costs of incarceration and recidivism).53
Today, we are more aware of the dismal racial disparities in
American employment: the joblessness rate is just over thirteen
percent for blacks—nearly double that of white workers, and
comparable to the national rate during the Great Depression—and
just below ten percent for Latinos.54 But, traditionally, the criminal
justice system has served to efface the real effect of race on
employment and poverty statistics by omitting incarcerated
populations from census counts.55 Even now there is still no official

conviction); see also Christopher Uggen & Jeremy Staff, Work as a Turning Point for
Criminal Offenders, 5 CORR. MGMT. Q. 1, 14 (2001), http://users.soc.umn.edu/
~uggen/Uggen_Staff_CMQ_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKT2-8SRK] (claiming that
“employment remains a viable avenue for reducing crime and recidivism” and finding
strong correlations between increased employment and reduced recidivism,
particularly for older ex-offenders).
52. See PETERSILIA, supra note 47, at 119. The unemployment rates of exoffenders are particularly high within the first few years out. In California, for
example, it is estimated that as many as eighty percent of ex-offenders remain jobless
a year after being released from prison. See id.
53. JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., EXOFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET (2010), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/
ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/97BB-862M]. In 2008 the Center for
Economic Policy and Research calculated that the population of people with felony
convictions lowered the official employment rate among all men as much as 1.7
percentage points. See id. at 1.
54. See Wright, supra note 29.
55. “The idea of “invisible inequality” is explained in the work Bruce Western
and Becky Petit. See Western & Petit, supra note 21. Their study shows that
unemployment rates—as they are conventionally measured by the Current
Population Survey, the large monthly labor force survey conducted by the Census
Bureau—do not measure the incarcerated population and, thus, drastically
underestimate the rate of unemployment, especially of young black men. This is
because the current Population Survey is drawn on a sample of households, so those
who are institutionalized are not included in the survey-based description of the
population. See id. at 12. When Western recalculated the employment rates for
young black men without a high school diploma in 2008, he found that the percent of
such individuals with jobs dropped from forty to twenty-five percent. See id.
According to Ta-Nehisi Coates, “[t]he illusion of wage and employment progress
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comprehensive data collected about the unemployment rates of exoffenders, let alone specific data about racial minorities with
records.56 This perpetuated political legacy of invisibility reflects the
entrenched and calculated connections between race and criminality
in this country’s opportunity structure.
II. THE NEGATIVE CREDENTIAL AND RACE
A. The Legal History That Gave Rise to the Need for States to
Ban-the-Box
This Part describes the legal history and context that produced the
need for ban-the-box legislation to protect people of color with
criminal records. Section 1 shows the chronology of Title VII
disparate-impact litigation and judicial interpretation. Section 2
explains the legally mandated employment discrimination against
people with records. Section 3 details the rise of the criminal
background check industry, its regulation by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”), and how the industry has exploited racial
biases shared by many employers about ex-offenders in the labor
market. Each of these individual narratives—along with political
context—contributed to a systemic failure by the legal apparatus to
protect the groups most vulnerable to criminal record discrimination.
The ban-the-box movement, as the product of these narratives, is
introduced in Section 4. There, this Note explores how the
motivating historical forces behind the ban-the-box laws signal
potential issues in their designs.

1.

History of Federal Court Treatment of Disparate Impact
Challenges to Employers’ Criminal Record Policies

Federal civil rights law was the first legal measure used to attempt
to counteract the structural racism inherent in hiring discrimination
against people with criminal records. This measure plays out through
an ironic logic: because the criminal justice system is proven to
disproportionately convict and incarcerate people of color, certain
forms of discrimination by employers against job applicants with
criminal records are prohibited under the disparate impact provision
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.57 While in the 1970s and

among African American males was made possible only through the erasure of the
most vulnerable among them from the official statistics.” See Coates, supra note 38.
56. See PETERSILIA, supra note 47, at 119.
57. See Michael Connett, Comment, Employer Discrimination against Individuals
with A Criminal Record: The Unfulfilled Role of State Fair Employment Agencies,
83 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2011).
While Title VII ”does not prohibit
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early 1980s Title VII suits involving employers’ consideration of
arrest and conviction records had “mixed results,” over time, the
success rate for plaintiffs in such suits has plummeted.58
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire
an individual because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”59 An employer does not need to intentionally discriminate to
violate the law.60 Even a policy that is neutral on its face will run
afoul of Title VII if the negative consequences fall too harshly on a
protected class and the policy is not related to the job at issue or
consistent with “business necessity.”61 The disparate impact theory
was first adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., where the Court found that an employer’s requirements that
applicants possess a high school diploma and pass a general
intelligence test were not permissible under Title VII.62 There, the
Court held that “any [hiring] tests used must measure the person for
the job and not the person in the abstract.”63 Thus, the Court
established an important antidiscrimination safeguard by interpreting
Title VII to require employers who use a hiring method with a

discrimination on the basis of criminal history per se,” people who have been rejected
for jobs or fired because of their criminal records have pursued discrimination claims
indirectly by alleging that facially neutral inquiries about criminal records
disproportionately disadvantage black and Latino applicants. See Alexandra Harwin,

Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against Minority Men with
Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 5 (2012).
58. Harwin, supra note 57, at 5. Harwin notes that while in the 1970s and early

1980s disparate impact claims were “among the most successful Title VII suits
brought by ex-offenders,” in no case since the late 1980s has a plaintiff won after a
trial on the merits. Id. at 6 n.59.
59. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
60. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
61. Id. at 430-31. Title VII targets two different types of discrimination:
“disparate treatment,” which includes employer practices that are motivated in whole
or in part by intentional discrimination against a protected class, and “disparate
impact,” which includes facially neutral employer practices that disproportionately
harm members of a protected class. See Harwin, supra note 57 at 5. In Griggs the
Court tangentially defined “business necessity” as an employment practice that can
“be shown to be related to job performance.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
62. In Griggs, the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund (“LDF”)
represented a group of thirteen black Duke Power Co. employees. The company had
a long history of segregating employees by race, relegating black employees to the
“labor department,” with the lowest paid jobs. Shortly after Congress passed Title
VII, Duke Power Co. stopped expressly restricting black employees to the labor
department. Instead, the company implemented IQ tests and required a high school
diploma for non-labor department jobs, despite the fact that it had never imposed
any such employment criteria previously. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-27.
63. Id. at 436.
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discriminatory impact to shoulder the burden of proving that the
method fulfills a genuine business need and is a valid measure of an
applicant’s ability to learn or perform the job in question.
Today, disparate impact claims are analyzed under a three step,
burden-shifting framework codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.64
First, the plaintiff must establish that the employer’s facially neutral
employment practice has a significantly adverse impact on a protected
class.65 Second, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the challenged policy was a business necessity.66
Third, the plaintiff can still prevail by demonstrating that the reason
offered by the defendant is a pretext.67 The plaintiff typically proves
this by showing that there is an alternative policy that avoids the
disproportionately harsh negative impacts on the protected class.68
In order to allege that an employer’s hiring policy discriminates on
the basis of applicants’ criminal histories, the injured party must begin
by filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency charged with enforcing
the dictates of Title VII.69 If the EEOC determines that there is
“reasonable cause” that the claimant suffered actionable
discrimination, then the agency will see the case through mediation,

64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The three-part burden-shifting framework was originally
adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green before it was later codified in the
Civil Rights Act. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
65. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
66. Id. In Griggs, the Court emphasized that the employer is required to
demonstrate that “any given [employment] requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question” or have a “demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which [the practice is] used.” Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 431-32. The meaning of business necessity has changed dramatically over the years
in Supreme Court opinions. See generally, Andrew Spiropoulos, Defining the

Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the
Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1478 (1995) (discussing the meaning of business

necessity and how the Supreme Court has altered the burden on employers to
demonstrate business necessity over time); Kelsey Sullivan, Risky Business:
Determining the Business Necessity of Criminal Background Checks 24 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 501 (2014) (examining what has constituted a business necessity defense for
employers who use background checks in a way that has a disparate impact on
minorities).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)(k)(1)(A)(ii).
68. Id.
69. Christina O’Connell, Ban the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to
Recognize A New Form of Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801,
2810 (2015).
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arbitration, or litigation.70 If the EEOC does not take the case, the
claimant is issued a Notice of Right-to-Sue, which grants them
permission to file a lawsuit themselves.71
In the 1970s and early 1980s, before Congress codified the three
part framework, disparate impact claims brought by people with
criminal records found moderate success in the federal courts with the
help of the EEOC.72 Many of these claims succeeded because federal
courts were fairly flexible in the type and quantity of statistical
evidence they accepted as sufficient to meet a prima facie case of
adverse impact on a protected class and judges looked skeptically
upon employers’ defenses about business necessity and jobrelatedness.73
The favorable treatment of such cases stemmed from a 1975 Eighth
Circuit decision, Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.74 There,
Buck Green, a black job applicant, brought a Title VII claim against
the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (“MoPac”) for refusing to
hire any person who had been convicted of a criminal offense other

70. Id. The EEOC also issues guidance on federal employment law to enforce
Title VII. See, e.g., OFF. OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
(2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PXZ8-LSJR] [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO.
915.002].
71. O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2810.
72. Harwin, supra note 57, at 6.
73. Id. For example, in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., the court was satisfied
with general population statistics showing proportionally higher rates of arrests and
convictions of racial minorities. 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Still, at that
time, the majority of successful claims involved challenging automatic and absolute
bans to employment based on criminal records and, even then, plaintiffs lost more
frequently than they won. Harwin, supra note 57, at 5, 10. For another “golden age,”
plaintiff-friendly case, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F.
Supp. 952, 965 (D.D.C. 1980) (invalidating the use of arrest records as “knock-out”
criteria). For an unfavorable plaintiff outcome, see, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522
F. Supp. 1283, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that the plaintiff’s failure to produce
applicant flow data—statistics comparing the racial composition of the employer’s
employees to its applicants—was fatal to his claim that the Postal Service’s refusal to
hire people with criminal convictions disparately impacted minority applicants). In
particular, the courts struck down most challenges to employers’ discretionary use of
conviction records (as opposed to a blanket exclusion). See Harwin, supra note 57, at
9. Another source of discrepancy in the outcomes of the cases revolved around the
use of arrest records—which the courts reviewed more critically—as opposed to
conviction records. See id.
74. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); see O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2810.
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than a minor traffic violation.75 Green argued that the absolute bar in
MoPac’s employment policy had a disparate impact on blacks and did
not relate to job performance.76 MoPac countered that the policy was
a business necessity because of concerns about theft, negligent
liability, and employment disruption.77 The Eighth Circuit upheld
Green’s Title VII claim, overruling the district court.78 The Eighth
Circuit first found that Green had established a prima facie case of
adverse impact based on general statistics including national data on
black and white conviction rates, in addition to the company’s
applicant flow data.79 Second, the court held that MoPac did not
meet the burden for the business necessity defense because it had
failed to provide any empirical validation to justify its job
requirements.80 On remand, the district court entered an injunction,
subsequently affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, stating that, in terms of
business necessity, the employer could consider an applicant’s
criminal history in the screening process only “so long as the
defendant takes into account the nature and gravity of the offense or
offenses, the time that has passed since the conviction and/or
completion of sentence, and the nature of the job for which the
applicant has applied.”81 In other words, the court enforced a strict
business necessity requirement in regards to employer consideration
of applicants’ conviction records.

75. Green, 523 F.2d at 1292. Green filed the suit on November 7, 1972 after
already filing discrimination charges with the EEOC. The EEOC also filed suit
against the defendant on April 5, 1973, on the basis of the plaintiff’s charges. The
court dismissed the EEOC’s suit because of the plaintiff’s previous filing pursuant to
an EEOC Right-to-Sue Notice, thus relegating the EEOC to permissive intervention
in the original suit. See EEOC v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
76. Green, 523 F.2d at 1292-93.
77. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2811 (citing Green, 523 F.2d. at 1298).
78. Green, 523 F.2d. at 1299.
79. In Green, the court recognized statistical data and treatises offered into
evidence by the plaintiff which indicated that, at that time, blacks were convicted of
crimes “at a rate at least two to three times greater than the percentage of blacks in
the populations of certain geographical areas.” Id. at 1294. The court also relied on
the testimony of an expert witness for the plaintiff, Dr. Ronald Christensen, who
concluded that, at the time, it was “between 2.2 and 6.7 times as likely that a black
person will have a criminal conviction record during his lifetime than that a white
person will have such a record.” Id.; see also Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp.
1283, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defining applicant flow data).
80. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2811 (citing Green, 523 F.2d at 1298).
81. See Smith, supra note 27, at 204 (quoting Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d
1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977)). These three factors—(1) the nature and gravity of the
offense(s); (2) the time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of the
sentence; and (3) the nature of the job held or sought—have become known as the
“Green Factors.” See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70.
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The relative frequency of successful cases like Green during early
disparate impact litigation can be at least partially attributed to the
efforts of the EEOC. In the 1970s, the EEOC was involved in many
authoritative cases contesting employers’ use of arrest and conviction
records—often carrying the suit by itself on behalf of an impacted
person.82 During the 1980s, the EEOC looked to the established
plaintiff-friendly disparate impact jurisprudence while developing its
official stance on the issues arising in these cases, including the types
of statistical proof required to demonstrate disparate impact and the
appropriate business necessity analysis.83 The agency issued a myriad
of enforcement guidelines, policy interpretations, and compliance
manuals firmly establishing the argument that job applicants of color
are adversely and disproportionately impacted by employers’ use of
arrest and conviction records—and prohibiting any such conduct
without business necessity as a categorical rule.84 The EEOC also
recognized a rebuttable presumption of the discriminatory impact of
such policies, therefore relieving job applicants of the legal and
financial burdens of producing their own statistical proof when they
filed claims with the agency.85 While the EEOC possesses only the

82. See, e.g., EEOC v. Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 561 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1977);
EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Riss
Int’l Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1094 (W.D. Mo. 1981); EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The EEOC lacked litigation authority prior to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. See Harwin, supra note 57, at n.41.
83. Harwin, supra note 57, at 9-10. For cases where business necessity is at issue,
the EEOC has employed an analysis that is particularly favorable to plaintiffs. This
analysis (which was originally even more plaintiff-friendly) was amended in 1985 to
“require employers to engage in a holistic inquiry about the nature and gravity of the
offense, the time since conviction or completion of the sentence, and the nature of
the job.” Id. at 11. In instances where the plaintiff challenges policies based on arrest
records (as opposed to conviction records), the EEOC advantages plaintiffs by calling
on employers to “assess the likelihood that a candidate had actually committed the
crime for which he had been arrested, by ‘examin[ing] the surrounding circumstances,
offer[ing] the applicant or employee an opportunity to explain, and, if he or she
denies engaging in the conduct, mak[ing] the follow-up inquiries necessary to
evaluate his/her credibility.’” Id. (quoting EEOC, NOTICE 915.061 (Sept. 7, 1990),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/arrest_records.html
[https://perma.cc/78PNKNQA].
84. Harwin, supra note 57, at 10. See, e.g., U.S. EEOC, CONVICTION RECORDS
(Feb. 4, 1987), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html [https://perma.cc/
P9HQ-ZR9A] [hereinafter EEOC CONVICTION RECORDS].
85. “[T]he Commission’s underlying position [is] that an employer’s policy or
practice of excluding individuals from employment on the basis of their conviction
records has an adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics in light of statistics showing
that they are convicted at a rate disproportionately greater than their representation
in the population.” See EEOC CONVICTION RECORDS, supra note 84. This
presumption leaves it up to the employer “to present more narrow local, regional, or
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limited power to persuade federal court decisions, in the 1970s and
the early 1980s the judiciary repeatedly deferred to the agency’s
interpretation of Title VII, leading to plaintiffs’ success in multiple
cases.86
Apart from the contributions of the EEOC, the “golden age” of
criminal history disparate impact litigation was also the result of
initial, progressive judicial interpretation of the legislative intent of
Title VII. The early decisions reflected the then-dominant belief that
Title VII is a broad-based prophylactic measure87 to “achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees.”88 During that time, federal judges played an
inflated role in determining the scope of disparate impact liability,
implementing ambiguous standards, later codified by Congress, that
afforded them considerable discretion—remaining to this day—in
assessing whether parties have met their individual burdens.89
Because of this discretion, when the Civil Rights Movement waned
and the ideology of the judiciary became increasingly conservative,
the federal courts began to uniformly reject plaintiffs’ challenges to
employers’ criminal records policies.90
Since the 1980s plaintiffs have lost almost every disparate impact
case about the consideration of criminal records in hiring practices,

applicant flow data, showing that the policy probably will not have an adverse impact
on its applicant pool and/or in fact does not have an adverse impact on the pool.”
Harwin, supra note 57, at 10.
86. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1985); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)). The
federal courts have the final word in interpreting the meaning of Title VII, and courts
defer to the EEOC’s decisions only insofar as they are persuasive. See Harwin, supra
note 57, at 11. As the Supreme Court explained in Gilbert v. General Electric Co.,
“[t]he weight [accorded to the EEOC’s] judgment in a particular case will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 429 U.S. 125, 140-42 (1976).
87. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 449 (1982).
88. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
89. Smith, supra note 27, at 204-05 (citing Michael J. Songer, Decline of Title VII

Disparate Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of
Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 268-70 (2005)). In particular, the Court

developed arbitrary and convoluted tests for distinguishing between disparate impact
and disparate treatment. When the political leaning of the judiciary changed, these
standards made it difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate discrimination that is not
intentional on its face. Id. at 205.
90. Id.; see also Harwin, supra note 57, at 12.
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“with judges frequently awarding summary judgment to employers.”91
The federal courts have made Title VII claims harder to bring by
increasing the plaintiff’s burden for establishing a prima facie case
and have radically relaxed the standards for employers to prove
business necessity and job-relatedness.92 In fact, judicial opinions
have expressed particular hostility toward disparate impact claims
brought by plaintiffs with criminal records.93 One Florida court even
held that such a claim went against the very purpose of Title VII by
arguing that denying employers the ability to discriminate based on
criminal records works to “stigmatize minorities by saying, in effect,
your group is not as honest as other groups.”94 The court went on to
advise, “[i]f Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because
they have been convicted of theft . . . then they should stop

91. Harwin, supra note 57, at 12 (citing Caston v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill., 215
F. Supp. 2d 1002 (C.D. Ill. 2002); McCraven v. City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 877
(N.D. Ill. 1998); and Brown v. City of New York, 869 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), in
which none of the plaintiffs won after a trial on the merits). In part, the high loss rate
reflected the fact that over fifty percent of the cases were brought pro se. See id. at
12. In not one case did a pro se litigant survive a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment; procedural defects were generally to blame. See id. (citing Wendy
Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 889 (2006)).
92. See Harwin, supra note 57, at 14; see also Smith, supra note 27, at 205-12. It
was in the Court’s decision Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio that the disparate
impact doctrine was most severely limited. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also infra note
102. In general, courts have increased the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden by rejecting
the argument that a policy of not hiring persons with criminal backgrounds is racially
discriminatory given the disproportionate representation of minorities in the prison
population. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2811-12; see, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman,
961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 798 (D. Md. 2013) (holding that for a plaintiff to meet its prima
facie showing of disparate impact, the statistics used “must be representative of the
relevant applicant pool” and not the population at large, as the EEOC had done in
that case and in the past). In conjunction with courts’ increased requirements from
plaintiffs since the 1980s, employers’ business necessity defenses have been viewed
with less and less scrutiny. See Harwin, supra note 57, at 14-15; see, e.g., Williams v.
Scott, 1992 WL 229849 at *2 (ND. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992) (disavowing any scrutiny of the
business necessity defense, claiming, “[i]t really requires nothing more than the
statement of [the employer’s] policy to explain its business justification.”).
Additionally, where courts had once taken particular care to distinguish between
arrests and convictions in hiring policies, after the 1980s, “they had no qualms about
upholding employer policies that disqualified applicants or employees based on
arrests that had never resulted in convictions.” Harwin, supra note 57 (citing Ramos
v. EquiServe, Inc., 146 F. App’x 565 (3d Cir. 2005)).
93. Harwin, supra note 57, at 13.
94. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla.
1989).
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stealing.”95 Needless to say, federal courts have ceased finding the
EEOC’s guidelines persuasive.96
The story of the shift in the federal courts’ treatment of criminal
history disparate impact cases tracks a change in federal courts’
attitude toward Title VII generally, and further, a larger judicial and
political trend to look skeptically on the idea that racial
discrimination is a systematic generator of social and economic
disadvantage, instead choosing to view it as a characterization of
isolated incidents of animus on the part of bad actors.97 Originally, in
Griggs and other early Title VII disparate impact cases, the Supreme
Court established precedent that, at least in theory,98 presumed
discrimination absent another compelling explanation for employer
conduct.99 But, over time, this presumption disappeared entirely.100

95. Id. This assertion by the court flies in the face of the multiple sources of data
that suggest that disproportionate representation of minorities in prisons is due to
over policing and discriminatory sentencing policies and not higher instances of
crime.
96. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the
EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1959 (2006).
97. See generally Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J., 279 (1997). This trend can be tracked
along equal protection case law and antidiscrimination litigation generally, spanning
legal issues from the death penalty, to criminal law, affirmative action, and voting
rights. For example, the Court’s treatment of the death penalty reflects a similar
trajectory of dismantling antidiscrimination protections to reject the concept of
structural racism. In Furman v. Georgia the Court held that the death penalty was
unconstitutional with concurring justices citing racial discrimination as a justification
for ending the penalty. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). Justice Marshall, citing statistics
evincing racial discrimination, argued that capital punishment is imposed
discriminatorily against certain identifiable classes of people. Id. at 364. (Marshall, J.,
concurring, “‘[I]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member
of the minority group—the man who, because he is without means, and is defended
by a court-appointed attorney—who becomes society’s sacrificial lamb.’”) (quoting
politician Michael DiSalle). Then, in Gregg v. Georgia the death penalty was
reinstated, and in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court flatly rejected the constitutional
challenge to disparate impact in the death penalty’s application. 428 U.S. 153, 206-07
(1976); 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McClesksy the court held that only proof of
purposeful discrimination against a particular capital defendant would suffice to
establish racial bias in capital sentencing, effectively barring a petitioner’s ability to
prove systemic racism in capital punishment. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 292-93.
98. See generally Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness,
Frederick Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 823
(2008) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education was the last attempt by the Court
to eliminate the present effects of past racial oppression).
99. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977). In Griggs, McDonnell Douglas,
and Teamsters, the Court acknowledged that even absent evidence of actual bad acts
or words evincing intent to discriminate, discrimination can still occur. With this
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The Court became increasingly reluctant to support measures
designed to encourage employers to comply with Title VII due to an
unfounded fear that these measures might eventually or effectively
impose quotas.101 In a 1989 case, Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, the Court fundamentally altered its disparate impact
analysis, making it harder for plaintiffs to prove their case by
undermining the presumption of discrimination that previously
accompanied a showing of impact.102 In Wards Cove, the Court made
plaintiffs “responsible for isolating and identifying the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed
statistical disparities.”103 The dissenters criticized the majority for its
radical shift in analysis. Justice Blackmun lamented, “[s]adly, this
comes as no surprise. One wonders whether the majority still
believes that race discrimination—or, more accurately, race
discrimination against nonwhites—is a problem in our society,

understanding, the Court showed a willingness to infer discrimination in a variety of
circumstances, reflecting an appreciation for societal discrimination.
100. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?,
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 575 (2001).
101. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 993-98 (1988). Justice
O’Connor feared that applying disparate impact analysis and broad use of statistics to
subjective and discretionary employment criteria might lead to the use of quotas.
Plaintiffs must identify the specific practices alleged to cause the disparity and explain
the causation. According to one scholar:
Justice O’Connor misreads the purpose and the structure of Title VII; she
assumes that in prohibiting preferential treatment, Congress meant that any
provision that imposed a duty on employers to take seriously the
requirement that blacks be hired and promoted, as well as paid equal wages,
violates that restriction. It does not. The plurality opinion, like much of the
discussion of Title VII by economists, misreads the statute and its purpose.
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. Neutrality, The Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act: The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 1001
(1993).
102. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In Wards Cove, the Court made several significant
changes to disparate impact jurisprudence. First, it did not permit the plaintiffs to
compare the racial composition of two different work areas—salmon cannery
workers and non-cannery workers—arguing that essentially this would be like
comparing apples to oranges. Thus, the plaintiffs could not even raise a prima facie
case of disparate impact. Second, the Court required the plaintiffs to identify the
specific employment practice that had caused the impact. Third, the Court no longer
shifted the burden of proof to the employer once the employees raised a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination. Instead, the Court imposed on the employer
a lesser burden of production. Finally, the Court shifted the employer’s defensive
showing from the Griggs standard—requiring a practice to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity—to a lighter standard requiring only a “business
justification.” Id. at 657-59; see Sullivan, supra note 66, at 511-13.
103. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994).
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or even remembers that it ever was.”104 The decision sparked
Congress to pass the 1991 Civil Rights Act to revert back to Griggsera burden shifting.105 Yet, while the Act partially restored the
earlier, plaintiff-friendly analysis, its ambiguous language further
complicated the state of disparate impact law by granting courts the
discretion to alter the substance of the procedural burdens.106 Since
then, courts have continued to demand exacting prima facie cases
from plaintiffs while maintaining relaxed standards for defendants.107
The trajectory of Title VII’s larger legal narrative demonstrates how
the Court has come to view the persistence of race discrimination
with deep skepticism.108 This position profoundly affects how lower
courts adjudicate and how the country at large understands the
problem of racism.
Still, despite this contemporary judicial disbelief about racial
disparate impact, the EEOC has continued to articulate the viewpoint
that criminal history discrimination disproportionately harms people
of color. In 2012, the agency issued revised enforcement guidance,
intended to “consolidate and update” its positions on employers’
consideration of applicants’ criminal records.109 The guidance
dedicates considerable attention to the intersections of race, national
origin, and criminal records in the context of employment

104. Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens ended his dissent by
noting that the reasons for the majority’s shift were “a mystery” to him. Id. at 671-72.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He further explained, “I cannot join this latest sojourn into
judicial activism.” Id.
105. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004); see also Sullivan, supra
note 66, at 512. Senator Kennedy introduced an amendment to Title VII “to restore
and strengthen civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment.” S. 2104, 101st
Cong. (1990); see also Linda Lye, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and
Confusion of Disparate Impact and The Business Necessity Defense , 19 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 334 (1998).
106. Nicole J. DeSario, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate
Impact Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 479, 501 (2003). The Civil
Rights Act of 1991:
requires plaintiffs to prove causation and identification in order to establish
a prima facie case; only if ‘the complaining party can demonstrate to the
court that the elements of a respondent’s decision-making process are not
capable of separation for analysis’ can the complainant proceed without
specifying the employment practice to which the disparate impact may be
attributed. Conspicuously absent from the Act is a discussion of the type of
statistical evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case.
Id. at 502 (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004)).
107. See id. at 506-07 (discussing the hurdles plaintiffs face today in using statistics
to establish a prima facie case).
108. Selmi, supra note 100, at 562-63.
109. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70.
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discrimination.110 It states explicitly that employers’ use of criminal
records to exclude people with criminal histories from employment
has disproportionately impacted blacks and Latinos because of their
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system.111
Using
hypothetical legal scenarios, the guidance outlines the principles
applicable to relying on criminal records in employment decisions and
the appropriate disparate treatment analysis for assessing Title VII
claims.112 The guidance has received considerable attention,113 and
the agency has in turn taken an aggressive posture in litigation.114
Overall, however, the guidance has not had a significant impact on
case outcomes.115 This history shows that while disparate impact
litigation at one point made it unnecessary to enact laws targeting
discrimination based on race and criminal records, the contemporary
legal climate requires an alternative avenue to combat such
discrimination.

2.

Legally-Mandated Discrimination

The limits to Title VII protection for people with past criminal
justice involvement are not purely a matter of judicial interpretation;
discrimination against ex-offenders is also mandated by thousands of

110. Id.; see Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U.
J. OF LEG. & PUB. POL’Y, 963, 983 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2383456 [https://perma.cc/3GCV-5TVQ].
111. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70, at 9-10
(“African Americans and Hispanics also are incarcerated at rates disproportionate to
their numbers in the general population . . . . National data . . . supports a finding that
criminal record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national
origin.”).
112. See generally id.
113. See Pinard, supra note 110, at 983.
114. See Smith, supra note 27, at 224-25. In particular, two recent cases litigated by
the EEOC resulted in settlements for the plaintiffs. See Verdict and Settlement
Summary, EEOC v. BMW Mfg. Co., 2015 WL 5719928 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2015);
Verdict and Settlement Summary, EEOC v. Dolgencorp, 2013 WL 6155464 (S.D.
Ind. Oct. 3, 2013).
115. Despite the successful outcomes mentioned above, other claims by the EEOC
have hit significant roadblocks. Compare supra note 114 (listing successful cases),
with, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013) (granting summary
judgment to the defendant and finding that the EEOC, in order to prevail, needed to
identify a more specific practice than the use of credit history and criminal
background checks, and prove the disparate impact of that practice); EEOC v.
Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming, in a credit
history disparate impact case, summary judgment for the defendant and finding that
the district court properly excluded the EEOC’s expert testimony regarding the
impact on the grounds that the expert did not have a reliable method of determining
individuals’ races).
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federal and state laws.116 With the rise of tough-on-crime politics in
the late 1980s came a torrent of new laws placing restrictions on the
employment prospects of people with criminal records.117 Today,
every state has laws that put some degree of criminal record
restrictions on employment.118 Certain convictions now disqualify a
person from holding appointed offices and civil service positions;119
serving in the military; working in some private sector industries,
agencies, and positions; and obtaining or retaining occupational
licenses.120 The restricted jobs range from nursing home aid, to real
estate agent, to pest control technician.121 Former felons are now
categorically barred from working in more than eight hundred
occupations because of laws and licensing rules.122

116. See Jessica H. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote ExOffender Employment, 6 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y, 755, 755-56 (2007),

http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Henry-Jacobs.BantheBox.article.Oct07.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2ZK-TYLL]; see also Jordan Segall, Mass Incarceration,
Ex-Felon Discrimination & Black Labor Market Disadvantage , 14 UNIV. PA. J. LAW
& SOC. CHANGE 159, 171 (2011).
117. See Segall, supra note 116, at 171; see also INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (summarizing research on consequences of incarceration).
118. See Segall, supra note 116, at 171.
119. See JACOBS, supra note 6:
A felony conviction is a permanent bar to public employment in seven
states. Many other states also disqualify felons from public employment but
allow for restoration of eligibility. Disqualifications can apply to all or some
felony convictions . . . . Federal hiring policy provides for discretion with
respect to excluding those with a criminal record from civil service jobs . . . .
The federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) imposes ‘suitability
requirements’ for federal civil service jobs based on subjective criteria . . . .
In 2013 the House of Representatives approved a bill that prohibits public
schools from employing teachers and other personnel with certain criminal
convictions.
Id. at 261-62.
120. See id. at 261.
121. See id. at 262-64; see also Darren Wheelock et al., Employment Restrictions

for Individuals with Felon Status and Racial Inequality in the Labor
Market, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON RE-ENTRY 278, 284 (Ikponwosa O. Ekunwe &

Richard S. Jones eds., 2011), http://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1044&context=socs_fac [https://perma.cc/4MTJ-YRA2] (listing, for example,
Florida statutes that limit the employment of ex-offenders).
122. See Wright, supra note 29. The American Bar Association identified over
38,000 statutes that attached collateral consequences to individuals convicted of
offenses, over eighty percent of which related to employment. See Amy L. Solomon,
In Search of a Job: Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, 270 NAT. INST.
JUST. J. 42, 44 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238488.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3L3X-UM47]; see also National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, JUST. CTR., http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ [https://perma.cc/
WM74-9MF6].
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These laws are premised on the assumption that certain
occupations in the private and public sectors pose so much risk to the
public that the government must ensure that they operate safely and
honestly.123 To be sure, some of these bars to employment, such as
banning a person convicted of money laundering from working in a
bank, seem reasonable.
However, many of these rules and
regulations tend to be highly over-inclusive, often disqualifying exoffenders from jobs and occupational licenses unrelated to their
convictions.124 This is because many of the bans apply to all
convictions or to all felonies and do not take into consideration the
time that has passed since the offense.125 For example, Pennsylvania
bars all ex-offenders form working in health care jobs, which
ultimately means that a person convicted of shoplifting could not be
hired to work as a janitor in a hospital.126 Even in states where a ban
affects only felons who have committed certain crimes, the category
of disqualifying crimes can be extremely broad.127 Additionally, there
is a mismatch in the intent and timing for laws that ban felons from
certain jobs and the types of felonies that actually exist.128 As the list
of federal felonies continues to increase, older, general laws barring
all felons—that were created when the term “felony” applied to
fewer, more serious crimes—are now more punitive than they were
intended to be.129 Further, laws that place restrictions on the public
sector pose particular disadvantages for black people who, compared
to people of other races, tend to be hired in the public sector more
frequently than in the private sector.130 In this way, lawmakers may
be viewed as those most responsible for undermining the EEOC’s
guidance.

123. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 264-65.
124. See Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection:

Comparing Former
Felons’ Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination , 56

STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2004) (surveying various laws restricting
the employment of ex-offenders in public and private employment).
125. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 269; Saxonhouse, supra note 124, at 1612.
126. See Saxonhouse, supra note 124, at 1612.
127. “In Delaware, for example, persons convicted of ‘an infamous crime’ are
barred from public employment, and in Georgia the ban applies to those convicted of
a felony involving ‘moral turpitude.’” Id. (referencing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4364,
and GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. III).
128. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8 (2006).
129. Id.
130. See Segall, supra note 116, at 174.
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The Rise of the Criminal Background Check Industry

Still, many employers who use criminal records to make hiring
decisions are not required to do so by law. Computers and the
information technology revolution have made criminal records more
publicly accessible than ever before, sparking a new industry that
controls and exploits the dissemination of conviction and arrest
information.131 Today, employers’ use of criminal background checks
is ubiquitous. In a 2009 survey, ninety-two percent of employers
reported electively conducting criminal background checks in their
standard hiring practices.132 These practices inhibit the reentry
prospects of applicants with criminal histories due to insufficient
regulation and misguided employer biases.133
The majority of hiring employers purchase applicants’ criminal
records cheaply and easily from private companies.134 The larger of
these companies copy publicly accessible court and other criminal
records into their own proprietary databases, while the smaller

131. For a comprehensive explanation of our nation’s criminal background check
databases, the policies that regulate them, and the privatized industry that has
capitalized on and problematized these policies, see generally JACOBS, supra note 6.
Court records are open to the public and increasingly accessible online. Some state
corrections departments (e.g., New Jersey) post online the names, photos, and
convictions of incarcerated people. In a few states, even prisoners’ disciplinary
records are publicly accessible. See id. at 7. What information gets included in a
criminal record depends on various, distinct government and state policies. See id.
“For example, states differ with respect to whether RAP sheets include juvenile
arrests and adjudications; whether they contain arrests and convictions for minor
offenses; whether summonses are recorded; whether arrests that do not result in
convictions are reported to non-criminal justice requesters; and which, if any, arrests
and convictions can be sealed or expunged.” Id. at 6-7. Additionally, local police
departments and prosecutors’ offices have their own policies on what information
they disseminate in response to requests for criminal record information from people
and entities who lack statutory designations. See id. at 7.
132. See SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.slideshare.net/
shrm/background-check-criminal [https://perma.cc/US5Y-8EZT]. The ninety-two
percent refers to background checks conducted by employers on applicants for some
or all of the employer’s available positions. Seventy-three percent required criminal
background checks for all hires. Id. These checks occur in varying stages of the hiring
process. Nearly seventy-five percent of employment applications inquire at the start
into an applicant’s criminal background. See Pager, supra note 29, at 955.
133. For a counter-argument, see Michael Stoll, Ex-Offenders, Criminal
Background Checks, and Consequences in the Labor Market , 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
381, 383 (2009) (arguing that most of the negative effects of record consideration are
driven by state statutes (rather than individual employer determinations), regardless
of whether or not the record is consulted).
134. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 70, 150.
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operations scour the Internet upon request.135 These companies
advertise their services as a means for employers to ensure they hire
reliable employees, while stoking demand by exaggerating the
potential legal and financial ramifications of hiring people with
criminal records.136
There are many policy issues with the booming background check
industry. Most troubling is that a staggering proportion of the records
retrieved in both commercial and government searches are erroneous,
typically due to failures in recording arrests’ dispositions, frequent
misattributions of criminal histories, multiple entries of the same
arrest or conviction, and mistaken names, among other clerical
errors.137
According to a National Employment Law Project
(“NELP”) report, out of an estimated 14.4 million FBI background
checks conducted for employment purposes (including those checks
that turned up no record), 1.8 million were based on erroneous or
incomplete information.138 Further, even valid RAP sheets are
virtually inscrutable to non-justice system personnel, and non-experts
frequently misinterpret their content.139
Congress enacted the FCRA of 1970, enforced by the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”), to, in part, protect consumers from the
abusive practices of companies engaged in selling criminal
background checks, known as consumer reporting agencies

135. Id. at 71.
136. Id. at 72, 88.
137. Id. at 133-39; see also CRAIG WINSTON, NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND
SCREENERS, THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER: A REVIEW AND
EVALUATION 6-7 (Aug. 2005), http://www.reentry.net/search/attachment.74268
[https://perma.cc/U682-66XX] (“[O]f the 174 million arrest cycles on file only 45%
have dispositions.”). Because many people who are arrested are never charged or
convicted, a high percentage of state police and the FBI’s records incorrectly indicate
a subject’s involvement in crime.
138. MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NELP, WANTED: ACCURATE
FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (July 2013), http://www.nelp.org/
content/uploads/2015/03/Report-Wanted-Accurate-FBI-Background-ChecksEmployment.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KYN-UGGW]. This data actually reflects that
fifty percent of records have failures, because the 18.8 million includes felony
background checks that resulted in a finding of no conviction. Another study
conducted by the Bronx Defenders in 2007 found that sixty-two percent of a random
sample of New York State RAP sheets contained at least one significant error and
thirty-two percent contained multiple errors. The number of errors ranged from one
to nine, with a median of two. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., THE PROBLEM OF RAP
SHEET ERRORS: AN ANALYSIS BY THE LEGAL ACTION CENTER 1 (2013),
https://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/LAC_rap_sheet_report_final_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4PL-N9JD].
139. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 46.
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(“CRAs”).140 In theory, the FCRA aims to balance the interests of
employers in making well-informed decisions with protecting
applicants from the dissemination of inaccurate, misleading, or
outdated information.141 It imposes obligations on CRAs to “adopt
reasonable procedures . . . in a manner which is fair and equitable to
the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy,
and proper utilization of [consumer reports].”142 While the statutory
language of the FCRA has the potential to afford job applicants the
opportunity to challenge a misleading or inaccurate report and to
discuss a criminal history with an employer, the outcomes of these
cases have been pitiful for plaintiffs. This is because courts have
adopted high standards for finding CRAs liable and the FTC has
provided little guidance on the interpretation of the FCRA’s
provisions.143

140. See Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact
of Pre-Employment Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &

POL’Y 231, 234 (2012). CRAs produce consumer reports, which contain specific
background information about a person’s criminal background and/or credit.
The FCRA gives the FTC power to issue ‘procedural’ rules enforcing the
requirements of the FCRA. However, the FTC does not have the authority
to issue rules with the force of law. As with the EEOC’s guidelines for
enforcing Title VII, any procedural rules issued by the FTC to administer
the FCRA will be examined by the court based on their ‘power to
persuade.’
O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2812-13.
In 2010, the authority to publish FCRA rules and guidelines was given to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Id. at n.93 (citing Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5581(5) (2010)).
About half the states also have their own fair credit reporting laws. SEARCH, NAT’L
CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON
THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 60 (2005),
http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD4S-LHB9].
141. 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2006).
142. Id. at § 1681(b). If a consumer reporting agency does not adhere to the law
they can be sued for damages. “Notwithstanding its focus on consumer report
accuracy, the FCRA prohibits CRAs from reporting arrests more than seven years
old. However, as of 1998, the FCRA no longer provides such an exception for
records of convictions.” JACOBS, supra note 6, at 78 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681c(a)(2)(5)). Thus, an employer may procure a prospective employee’s
consumer report with a criminal conviction that occurred decades before the date of
the report. See Concepción, supra note 140, at 234. Official criminal justice databases
are not governed by the FCRA because they are not defined as consumer reporting
agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 1681. This limitation begs the question: is it better for the
government to get its criminal record information from a private data provider who
can be regulated by the FCRA or from official state criminal justice databases
without regulation?
143. The FCRA offers a private cause of action against CRAs who violate the
statute, but the plaintiff can only succeed if the CRA is found to have reported

2017]

ERASING THE MARK OF CAIN

1181

Under the mandates of the FCRA, employers interested in
procuring a consumer report for hiring consideration are required to
provide notice and obtain written authorization from applicants.144 If
an employer decides to deny an applicant a position based on the
findings of the CRA’s report, then the employer must furnish the
applicant with a copy of the report as well as a description of their
rights.145
Although an applicant must first consent to the
procurement of a consumer report, employers are allowed to
condition employment on such consent.146 Therefore, as one legal
scholar put it, “the current legal regime . . . has permitted the securing
of criminal background checks to develop into the widespread
practice it has become.”147 The FCRA seems to have evolved into
another enabling mechanism of the proliferating background check
industry.
The prevalence of criminal background checks in hiring decisions
across industries is also a reflection of employer biases that have
developed as a result of misconceptions about what it means to have a
criminal record. One study found that two-thirds of employers
surveyed in four major U.S. cities would not knowingly hire a person
with a criminal record, regardless of the offense.148 Proponents of
these background checks assume that screening applicants for past
criminal behavior will eliminate problem employees and protect
against negligent hiring liability,149 regardless of whether the past
inaccuracies due to “negligent or willful noncompliance.” O’Connell, supra note 69,
at 2813.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(B)(i).
145. Id. at § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii).
146. Concepción, supra note 140, at 235.
147. Id.
148. HARRY J. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS WANT: JOB PROSPECTS FOR LESSEDUCATED WORKERS (1996). The survey was administered to over 3000 employers
in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles.
149. From the viewpoint of employers, a criminal record may signal an
untrustworthy or otherwise problematic employee due to a perceived increased
propensity to break rules, steal, or harm customers, or because the employer fears
negligent hiring lawsuits.
Under the theory of negligent hiring, employers may be liable for the risk
created by exposing the public and their employees to potentially dangerous
individuals. That is, ‘employers who know, or should have known, that an
employee has had a history of criminal activity may be liable for the
employee’s criminal or tortious acts.’ Thus, employers may be exposed to
punitive damages as well as liability for loss, pain, and suffering as a result of
negligent hiring.
Stoll, supra note 133, at 388 (citing Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of
Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 276, 277 (2004)).
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crime is correlated to the job in question. This position is based on
the assumption that once a person has committed a crime, they will
likely commit crimes again in the future, even though numerous
studies have shown this theory to be flawed.150 In fact, the risk of
recidivism has been proven to decrease as time since last criminal
justice contact increases.151
Therefore, the likelihood that an
applicant with a criminal record will partake in future crime
compared to another similarly situated applicant without a record is
extremely dependent on the time that has passed since the offense.152
Further, stability factors—like employment—play a powerful role in
reducing that likelihood. Additionally, according to a 2007 study
measuring the relationship between criminal history and work
150. See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 331 (2009). There

are three leading lines of research explaining the factors that break recidivism. The
first argues that “changes in the life course of offenders,” like marriage and
employment for example, are the primary predictor for risk of future involvement in
crime. Id. (citing Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters?
Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent Boys Followed to Age 70, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 301 (2003); Robert J. Sampson, John H. Laub & Christopher Wimer,

Does Marriage Reduce Crime? A Counterfactual Approach to Within-Individual
Causal Effects, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 465 (2006); Christopher Uggen, Ex-Offenders and
the Conformist Alternative: A Job Quality Model of Work and Crime, 46 SOC.
PROBS. 127 (1999); Joel Wallman & Alfred Blumstein, After the Crime Drop, in THE

CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2006); Mark
Warr, Life-Course Transitions and Desistance From Crime, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 183
(1998)). The second line of research shows that there is a “steady decline in criminal
activity after a peak in the late teens and young-adult period, and [that] aging is one
of the most powerful explanations of desistance.” Id. (citing David P. Farrington, Age
and Crime, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, vol. 7
(Michael H. Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986); Travis Hirschi & Michael R.
Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (1983)). Finally,
the third line argues that “time clean since the last offense strongly affects the
relationship between past and future offending behavior.” Id. (citing MICHAEL
MALTZ, RECIDIVISM (1984); PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D. WITTE, PREDICTING
RECIDIVISM USING SURVIVAL MODELS (1988); Christy Visher, Pamela K. Lattimore
& Richard L. Linster, Predicting the Recidivism of Serious Youthful Offenders Using
Survival Models, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 329 (1991)). However, contrary research argues
that there is a strong correlation between past and future offending. Id. (citing Alfred
Blumstein, David P. Farrington & Soumyo Moitra, Delinquency Careers: Innocents,
Desisters, and Persisters in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH,
vol. 6 (Michael H. Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985); Robert Brame, Shawn D.
Bushway & Raymond Paternoster, Examining the Prevalence of Criminal
Desistance, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 423 (2003); David Farrington, Predicting Individual
Crime Rates, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, vol. 9
(Don M. Gottfredson & Michael H. Tonry eds., 1987); ALEX PIQUERO, DAVID P.
FARRINGTON & ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL CAREER RESEARCH:
NEW ANALYSES OF THE CAMBRIDGE STUDY IN DELINQUENT DEVELOPMENT (2007)).
151. Id. at 332.
152. Id.; see also supra note 150 (citing additional sources).
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productivity (the only study so far to do so), criminal convictions in
adolescents do not predict counterproductive work behaviors in early
adulthood.153 These findings suggest that the hostile contemporary
climate surrounding the employment of people with records is created
by socially produced, subjective prejudice, explaining and facilitating
its correlation with prevalent racial biases.154 Because this prejudice
has yet to be diminished by mounting evidence that it is unfounded,
people with records and advocacy groups have been forced to find
creative solutions to address it.

4.

Enter Ban-the-Box Laws

The above context, bolstered by judicial conservatism and social
biases, has necessitated a new legislative protection for people with
past criminal justice involvement: the “ban-the-box” law. More than
one hundred states, cities, and counties have adopted ban-the-box
initiatives to ameliorate private and public sector discrimination
against job applicants with criminal records.155 At a minimum, these
laws mandate the removal of the “box” on an employment
application form that must be checked if the applicant has ever been
convicted of (and sometimes arrested for) a crime.156 The strategy
behind these laws is, on the one hand, to prevent employers from
stereotyping applicants with criminal records as less desirable
employees before individually assessing their skills and, on the other
hand, to counteract the deterrent effect that the box often has on
individuals with criminal records.157 These laws do not work to
entirely preclude employers’ consideration of criminal history but,
rather, to defer this consideration until later on in the hiring
process.158 So far, ban-the-box laws have been largely race-neutral,

153. See Brent W. Roberts et al., Predicting the Counterproductive Employee in a
Child-to-Adult Prospective Study, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1427, 1434 (2007).
154. A series of studies relying on surveys and in-depth interviews found that firms
are reluctant to hire young minority men—especially blacks—because they are seen
as unreliable, dishonest, or lacking in social or cognitive skills. Devah Pager, Bruce
Western & Bart Bonikowski, Race at Work: A Field Experiment of Discrimination
in Low-Wage Labor Markets, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2009) (citing, e.g., ROGER
WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS: IMMIGRATION
AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR (2003)).
155. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NELP, BAN THE BOX
FAIR CHANCE STATE AND LOCAL GUIDE (2017), http://www.nelp.org/content/
uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35XX-WZUC] [hereinafter NELP GUIDE].
156. See id.
157. See Henry & Jacobs, supra note 116, at 757.
158. See id.
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focusing on the status of the applicant as a person with a previous
criminal record and not on the particular direct and collateral
consequences that criminal records have on people of color.
A San Francisco-based ex-offender group, All of Us or None
(“AUN”), led the ban-the-box movement in 2004, persuading the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors to pass a resolution calling on the city
and county to eliminate the criminal record question from public job
application forms, except in instances where state or local law
expressly barred certain ex-offenders from a particular job.159 Under
this resolution, an employer can consider an applicant’s criminal
background only once they have been selected as a finalist for the
position.160 At that point, a criminal record would only be relevant if
it created an unacceptable risk that the applicant could not fulfill the
job’s requirements.161 Since AUN’s initial efforts, the movement has
consistently gained momentum, demonstrating enormous organizing
power with support from communities of color.162 At least twentyone state governments have adopted ban-the-box policies.163 Seven
states—Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Oregon, and Rhode Island—have even removed the conviction
history question on job applications for private employers. 164
While all ban-the-box laws delay the moment in the hiring process
when an employer can ask an applicant about his or her criminal
history, the laws vary substantially by jurisdiction.165 First, the laws
differ in form, ranging from executive orders, to resolutions, to civil

159. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 271 (citing S.F., Cal., Resolution No. 764-05 (Oct.
11, 2005), http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions05/r0764-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MG6F-68JC]).
160. See id.
161. See Henry & Jacobs, supra note 116, at 757.
162. See, e.g., Executives’ Alliance, Executives’ Alliance Foundation Leaders “Ban

the Box, Issue Call to Action for All U.S. Philanthropic Institutions to Adopt Fair
Chance Hiring Measures, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.prnews

wire.com/news-releases/executives-alliance-foundation-leaders-ban-the-box-issuecall-to-action-for-all-us-philanthropic-institutions-to-adopt-fair-chance-hiringmeasures-300227780.html [https://perma.cc/AG9V-ZN76] (showing how AUN and
the California’s Alliance for Boys and Men of Color worked together to advance
ban-the-box legislation). Successful advocacy like this is due in large measure to
mobilization efforts by individuals with criminal records, organizations formed by
and working with those individuals, as well as networks of policy and legal
organizations.
163. See NELP GUIDE, supra note 155.
164. Id.
165. Adriel Garcia, Note, The Kobayashi Maru of Ex-Offender Employment:
Rewriting the Rules and Thinking Outside Current “Ban the Box” Legislation , 85
TEMP. L. REV. 921, 927-29 (2013).
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rights statutes. In terms of their content, there are six areas of the
laws, in particular, where differences arise:166 (1) whether the law
covers public or private employers, or both;167 (2) the stage in the
hiring process at which criminal history information can be
considered;168 (3) the types of criminal history information that can be
considered;169 (4) the factors an employer must use to evaluate the
criminal history information;170 (5) the disclosure obligations for an
166. For a detailed layout of these six variations among ban-the-box laws, see
O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2818-28.
167. The majority of ban-the-box laws apply to public employers only. These laws
typically cover state, city, and district jobs, but the scope of what constitutes a public
employer is also defined by these statutes. For example, Connecticut’s publicemployer statute only applies to jobs at the state level. Id. at 2821 (citing CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46a-80(a): “a person shall not be disqualified from employment by the state
[of Connecticut] or any of its agencies . . . .”). Still, while most ban-the-box laws
apply to public employers only, there are a number of jurisdictions that regulate the
hiring policies of private companies as well, and some that regulate both. See, e.g.,
NELP GUIDE, supra note 155. The Hawaii statute, for example, affects public and
private employers. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(a) (West 2013).
168. The time at which an employer can—under a ban-the-box law—conduct a
criminal background check on an applicant (if at all) spans a significant range. See
O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2822. Some statutes designate this point at the time an
applicant is offered an interview. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.021(a) (West 2013)
(stating that a public employer in Minnesota may not inquire into the criminal
background of an applicant until the applicant has been selected for an interview).
Others designate the point at the time an applicant is determined to be qualified for
the position. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(b) (West 2013) (stating that
employers in Connecticut cannot even inquire about a prospective employee’s past
convictions until such prospective employee has been deemed otherwise qualified for
the position). Still others require the employer to wait until a conditional offer is
made. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(b) (West 2013) (stating that Hawaiian
employers may only consider an applicant’s criminal background after extending a
conditional offer of employment to the applicant). This variation in timeframe is due
to legislators’ desire to balance “both the applicant’s interest in demonstrating his or
her qualifications to an employer with the employer’s interest in using its time
productively.” O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2821-22.
169. Several ban-the-box statutes limit the consideration employers can give to an
applicant’s record to specific offenses and time periods, while others make no such
limitations. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2822. For example, a law might limit
an employer’s ability to consider a prospective employee’s arrest or misdemeanor
record. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(e); HAW. REV. STAT. § 3782.5(c) (limiting Hawaiian employers from considering convictions more than ten
years old from the period of incarceration). Other statutes, however, like that in
Minnesota, impose no limitation on what employers can consider. See MINN STAT.
ANN. § 364.021(a) (making no explicit limitation on the information available to
employers in Minnesota).
170. Many of the laws present criteria for how an employer should weigh an
applicant’s specific criminal history. “Typical factors include: the seriousness of the
conviction, the crime’s relationship to the job, the time elapsed since arrest or
conviction, and the applicant’s rehabilitation efforts.” O’Connell, supra note 69, at
2824.
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employer after conducting a background check;171 and (6) the entity
responsible for enforcing the laws.172 These differences make it
difficult to analyze the impact of ban-the-box legislation as a whole
because there are a variety of factors to independently isolate and
measure.173
Despite these difficulties, ban-the-box legislation has been widely
celebrated for improving the employment outcomes of people with
criminal records.174 But when the data about those employment
outcomes is scrutinized, crucial information is missing: there has been
no measurement of the laws’ impact on the specific population of
people of color with records. The main reason for this failure is likely
a contemporary political resistance to citing racial disparities as a

171. Some statutes require an employer to disclose to an applicant once it has
conducted a criminal background check. Laws with this provision further mandate
that the employer disclose to the applicant what the check revealed and, if the
criminal history precludes the applicant from the position, explain the reasons why.
This variation in the laws also generally provides an opportunity for the applicant to
challenge any inaccuracies in the background check.
172. The agencies and state departments that have been designated as enforcers of
ban-the-box laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, Delaware and
Illinois both place their Departments of Labor in charge of regulating unlawful
discrimination on the basis of a background check, while San Francisco has tasked its
Office of Labor Standards Enforcement with enforcing the city’s Fair Chance
Ordinance (creating preemption concerns, because San Francisco’s fair chance
initiative is much stricter than California’s ban-the-box law). But many state ban-thebox statutes do not name an enforcement agency or lay out what remedies are
available to plaintiffs. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland,
Nebraska, and New Mexico do not expressly charge any state government agency
with enforcement responsibilities.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island handle
enforcement through special commissions created and tasked to investigate ban-thebox violations. Minnesota places public employers in charge of their own compliance
with the ban-the-box legislation and instructs government agencies to follow the
adjudication procedures set forth in the state’s Administrative Procedure Act. For
private employers, the state’s Commissioner of Human Rights conducts
investigations of alleged violations and imposes monetary penalties. See O’Connell,
supra note 69, at 2826-28. The laws also show a wide variance in penalties on
noncomplying employers: Massachusetts’ criminal review board has the power to
impose fines up to $5000 for each violation. In contrast, Rhode Island allows for
monetary fines, backpay, and other compensatory awards upon a finding of
intentional discrimination. See id. at 2828.
173. Even the forms of these laws vary. For example, executive orders and
administrative policies are not voted on by representatives because the sole decision
is made by the executive branch—therefore they are less susceptible to public
scrutiny and do not have the same level of public transparency. Municipal ordinances
(a more permanent policy solution) are passed through a public process where
members of the city or county government vote on the record, which gives the
community the ability to hold elected representatives accountable for their voting
record.
174. See infra Part III.
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justification for increasing protections for people with criminal
records in hiring practices.175
While nearly half of the ban-the-box laws implemented so far
comply with the 2012 EEOC guidance,176 which is informed by
disparate impact theory,177 their formal legislative intents are, for the
most part, silent as to any anti-racial discrimination motivations.178
San Francisco’s 2014 Fair Chance Ordinance is a good example of the
dissonance between the advocacy that originally drove the
implementation of these laws and the legal orientations of their final
products in regards to considerations of race.179 The AUN campaign,
which spearheaded both the city’s original 2004 resolution for public
employers and the newer ordinance—applying to private employers
as well—has always remained vocal about the connections between
criminal record employment discrimination and race.180 Yet, the
175. “Advocates and sponsors of these laws have argued, primarily, that the
practices these laws target amount to pervasive, and growing, barriers to
employment—barriers that make it very difficult for large numbers of people, of all
races, to find a job.” Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment
Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1442 (2014).
176. See NELP GUIDE, supra note 155.
177. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70.
178. Indeed, in some legislative debates, the issue of racial disparate impact does
not appear to have been discussed at all. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 4 Before the S.
Fin. Comm., 2013 Leg., 433rd Sess. (Md. 2013). At the Finance Committee hearing
about Maryland’s ban-the-box bill, speakers made a variety of arguments but race
and disparate impact were not mentioned. Id.; see also Fishkin, supra note 175, at
1442 (“[I]n state legislatures . . . the racial disparate impact story, while present to
some degree, has not been the primary justification legislators have offered for
enacting these laws”). For examples of laws that do expressly mention discriminatory
impact in their purpose and/or legislative histories, see PHILA. CITY COUNCIL, § 93501-1(e) (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.phila.gov/HumanRelations/PDF/BanTheBox
Ordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPC8-S8CX]; N.Y. COMM. ON CIV. RTS., REPORT OF
THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION 4 (June 9, 2015), http://legistar.council.nyc.
gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1739365&GUID=EF70B69C-074A-4B8E-9D36187C76BB1098 [https://perma.cc/U8CW-XFVM]. These examples of legislation that
effectively incorporate the importance of combating disparate impact on racial
minorities reveal the extent of the limitations of other comparable laws that do not
incorporate this intent in their express purposes.
179. Bd. of Supervisors, File No. 131192, NELP (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/San_Francisco_Fair_Chance_Ordinance
_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ6M-AYD7].
180. See Ban the Box, LEGAL SERV. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILD.: ALL OF US OR
NONE,
http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/our-projects/allofus-or-none/ban-thebox-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/AA47-L75E]; see also Dorsey Nunn, Ban the Box
Keeps Families and Communities Together, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016 3:21 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/13/should-a-jail-record-be-anemployers-first-impression/ban-the-box-keeps-families-and-communities-together
[https://perma.cc/Q38N-VNBL] (“The American criminal justice system has been and
continues to be fraught by racism. People of color in general and black people in
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“Findings” section of the new law, which lists its purposes and intent,
performs rhetorical gymnastics to avoid mentioning race at all:
A major rationale for this movement is the growing awareness that
incarceration has devastating socioeconomic consequences.
Researchers have found that more incarceration has the perverse
effect of increasing the crime rate in some communities. Children
suffer academically and socially, and have decreased economic
mobility, after the incarceration of a parent. Incarceration is also
linked to homelessness, impacting public health and safety. Twentysix percent of homeless people surveyed in San Francisco had been
incarcerated within the previous twelve months and an estimated
thirty to fifty percent of parolees in San Francisco are homeless. 181

The language of the Act goes on to identify “criminal justice costs”
as the primary incentive for implementing the legislation, so that
taxpayers will save money.182
San Francisco’s story of de-racialized legislative intent is not
unique. In New Jersey the advocacy group New Jersey Institute for
Social Justice (“NJISJ”)—which aims to “ensure the civil rights and
other equal opportunities of minorities and low-income
individuals”183—spearheaded the state’s ban-the-box movement by
engaging the local private employer community through “business
roundtables.”184 NJISJ’s advocacy kept racial impact at the center of
the discussions about the law. In a 2013 press release signaling the
upcoming ban-the-box legislation, NJISJ stated, “[a] majority of the
nation’s 65 million people with criminal records are people of color,
and these communities are among those most impacted by these
practices.”185 Yet, while the coalition-building efforts of the NJISJ
were motivated by antidiscrimination language, the intent of the law
was memorialized in race-neutral terms. The statute begins with a
section entitled: “findings and declarations regarding employment of

particular are being stopped, detained, questioned, arrested, convicted, and
sentenced more often than whites. Black men are six times as likely as white men to
be incarcerated during their lifetime. This means that we are unable to fairly
compete for employment because of a conviction history or the assumption of having
one, based on race.”).
181. NELP, supra note 179, at 3.
182. Id.
183. About NJISJ, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUST., http://www.njisj.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/R6PB-ZZYE].
184. NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 18.
185. NJISJ Press Release: New Legislation Opens Opportunity to Compete for
Employment, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUST. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.njisj.org/njisj_
press_release_new_legislation_opens_opportunity_to_compete_for_employment
[https://perma.cc/4687-33AE].
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persons with criminal records,” and, like the San Francisco ordinance,
the statute does not mention combating disparate impact on racial
minorities. Instead, the law openly states, “[i]t is the intent and
purpose of ‘The Opportunity to Compete Act’ to improve the
economic viability, health, and security of New Jersey
communities.”186 One wonders why race is erased from the language
of these laws, enacted after being led by very race-conscious
movements.187
The jettisoning of race from the language of the ban-the-box laws
has led to the complete failure to measure the impact of the laws on
minority groups.188 In order to take stock of what these laws can truly
accomplish, it is necessary both to enforce data collection, where it
has already been implemented, that specifically measures the
employment of black and Latino people with past criminal justice
involvement and to build this data mandate into legislation going
forward. In the wake of the Obama Administration’s consideration
of a federal ban-the-box law,189 a moment of self-awareness is called
for to recognize the history behind these laws and to consider to
whom they should apply.

186. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-12 (2014).
187. Potentially, a reason for this erasure is the fact that race is a suspect
classification and would be subject to strict scrutiny and more likely to be invalidated,
even if the statute purports to be racially beneficial; the legislative gymnastics may
ensure that the statute, if challenged, would presumably only be subject to rational
basis review.
188. See infra Part III.
189. See Dave Boyer, Obama Finalizes Regulation to ‘Ban the Box’ on Hiring Job
Applicants With Criminal Records, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/nov/30/obama-finalizes-regulation-banbox-job-applicants/ [https://perma.cc/Y9NQ-2KBX]; Fact Sheet:
White House
Launches the Fair Chance Business Pledge, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/11/fact-sheet-white-houselaunches-fair-chance-business-pledge [https://perma.cc/7CFQ-7L2V]. Following on
the heels of President Obama’s endorsement of the ban-the-box movement in 2015,
Attorney General Loretta Lynch hosted officials of nineteen companies to create a
founding business pledge to implement federal fair chance hiring policies. NELP
believes that a federal ban-the-box law is on the horizon. On the President’s
Announcement on ‘Ban the Box’ Hiring, NELP (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.nelp.org/news-releases/on-the-presidents-announcement-on-ban-the-boxhiring/ [https://perma.cc/ZS8U-5MNL]. See also Reuters, Obama Calls to “Ban the
Box,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/video/multimedia/
100000004014582/obama-calls-to-ban-the-box.html [https://perma.cc/9Y86-D2X4].
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B. Reconsidering and Repositioning Ban-the-Box in Light of
Sociological Studies and Their Political-Historical Context
The absence of race conscious language from the ban-the-box
legislation is problematic because it obfuscates not only the source of
the momentum behind these laws but also the possibility that
employers will manipulate them by making assumptions about
criminal history based on racial prejudice. This Note identifies these
issues to strengthen the legislation going forward and to advocate for
reinforcing the visibility of race in efforts to ameliorate the collateral
consequences of having a criminal record.

1.

Sociological Study on Race, Criminality, and Employment

First, it is important to acknowledge that, even though racial
impact was the original driving force behind ban-the-box legislation
(and remains so among many advocacy groups),190 empirical research
on the hiring practices around criminal records has not shown that
removing the box will necessarily improve employment outcomes for
people of color with records. Devah Pager’s 2003 study remains so
crucial because it demonstrates that, among the Milwaukee
employers observed, overt racial discrimination and its links to
perceived criminality were even more prevalent than discrimination
based on the records themselves.191 Therefore, even in the absence of
criminal background checks, employers often use race or racial
indicators (such as education levels) to make assumptions about
criminality and unsuitability for jobs.192
In fact, some sociologists argue that removing the box could have
an adverse impact on the employment of people of color with records

190. See, e.g., Cornell William Brooks, Ban the Box, BRENNAN CTR. (Apr. 27,
2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/ban-box
[https://perma.cc/4E7M7QRB] (showing that increased employment outcomes for people of color with
records specifically remains a central policy concern for the NAACP).
191. See PAGER, supra note 8.
192. Id. at 93. There are two central findings of Pager’s study in respect to the
specific hardship of ex-offender status for people of color. First, the criminal record
stigma effect is larger for blacks (given the sixty-five percent reduction in the callback
rates for black ex-offenders, relative to the fifty percent reduction for whites).
Second, animus-based racial discrimination against blacks is more important than
record-based discrimination in explaining the inferior employment outcomes of black
men (given the finding that black non-offenders receive fewer callbacks than white
ex-offenders). Interestingly, although race emerged as a key theme in Pager’s
findings, the topic of racial discrimination was not the central focus of the original
research. In fact, the research design yielded only indirect evidence of racial
discrimination because black and white testers did not apply to the same employers.
See PAGER, supra note 8.
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because of the insidious racial biases surrounding criminality in
America. Public policy professors Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael,
and Michael Stoll conducted multi-city, survey-based research in 2006
that revealed that employers are actually more likely to hire black
Americans if they check criminal records, particularly employers who
report being generally averse to hiring ex-offenders.193 In other
words, confirming Pager’s findings, when criminal records were not
consulted, black people were assumed to have them. Holzer,
Raphael, and Stoll identify this phenomenon as “statistical
discrimination,” meaning that employers who look unfavorably on
applicants with criminal histories systematically overestimate the
correlation between race and criminality.194 Their analysis even
suggests that this statistical discrimination is significant enough to
undermine any negative effects of criminal background checks on
black hiring rates by detrimentally affecting the job prospects of
individuals with clean histories who belong to demographic groups
that have high conviction rates.195 Michael Stoll updated the study in
2009, relying on new data, and confirmed the results of the earlier
research.196
Also in 2009, Bruce Western, Bart Bonikowski, and Devah Pager
published an extension of Pager’s 2003 study, investigating statistical
discrimination more closely.197 They had created matched teams of
white, black, and Latino testers who had applied to 340 real, entrylevel jobs in New York City in 2004.198 Their work confirmed the
193. Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll, Perceived Criminality,
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. L.

& ECON. 451 (2006).
194. Id. at 452 (borrowing from economic theory).
195. See id.; see also Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Will

Employers Hire Former Offenders? Employer Preferences, Background Checks,
and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS

INCARCERATION 205, 236 (Mary Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce Western eds.,
2004).
196. See generally Stoll, supra note 133. Stoll’s work also showed that legallymandated discrimination was the main source of the negative impact of background
checks on employers’ hiring decisions, and that for those employers who were not
required to check criminal history, the check itself was neither the rate-determiningfactor nor the source of discrimination. Id. at 407.
197. Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in a LowWage Labor Market: A Field Experiment 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2009),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2915472/#APP1
[https://perma.cc/T5MJ-ST69].
198. Id. The testers were selected for specific qualities: they were well-spoken,
clean-cut young men, ages twenty-two to twenty-six. Most of them were collegeeducated, between five feet ten inches and six feet in height, and recruited in and
around New York City.
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earlier determination of intense contemporary racial attitudes. The
new study found that employer prejudice fell into three categories of
behavior: (1) “categorical exclusion,” characterized by an immediate
rejection of the black candidate in favor of a white applicant; (2)
“shifting standards,” reflecting actively shaped decisions made
through a racial lens that considers black applicants more critically
than whites;199 and (3) “race-based job channeling,” resulting in
steering black applicants toward particular job types usually with
greater physical demands and reduced customer contact.200 Together,
these categories “illustrate how racial disadvantage is dynamically
constructed and reinforced, with the assessment of applicant
qualifications and suitability subject to interpretation and bias.”201
The arbitrary nature of statistical discrimination likely makes it
difficult to approach legislatively. Indeed, Western has questioned
whether limiting criminal background information will have the
desired effect for minority ex-offenders.202
However, Pager, Western, and Bonikowski’s report indicated an
intervention point for ban-the-box laws and their potential to have a
real impact on increasing employment outcomes of people of color
with records.203 Black applicants who met face-to-face with hiring
authorities were found to fare better than those who did not,204

199. Id. The researchers provided an example of shifting standards prejudice they
observed in the field:
In one case, Joe, a black tester, was not allowed to apply for a sales position
due to his lack of direct experience. He reported, ‘[the employer] handed
me back my résumé and told me they didn’t have any positions to offer
me . . . that I needed a couple years of experience.’ The employer voiced
similar concerns with Josue and Kevin, Joe’s Latino and white partners.
Josue wrote, ‘After a few minutes of waiting . . . I met with [the employer]
who looked over my résumé. He said that he was a little worried that I
would not be able to do the work.’ Kevin reported an even stronger
reaction: ‘[The employer] looked at my résumé and said, ‘There is
absolutely nothing here that qualifies you for this position.’ Yet, despite
their evident lack of qualifications, Kevin and Josue were offered the sales
job and asked to come back the next morning. In interactions with all three
testers, the employer clearly expressed his concern over the applicants’ lack
of relevant work experience. This lack of experience was not grounds for
disqualification for the white and Latino candidates, whereas the black
applicant was readily dismissed.

Id.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Bruce Western, Criminal Background Checks and Employment Among
Workers with Criminal Records, 7 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 413, 413 (2008).
203. Pager, Western & Bonikowski, supra note 197.
204. Id.
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suggesting that in-person contact has the power to replace broad
generalizations based on group membership with more nuanced
information about an applicant’s individual qualities.205 Christopher
Uggen and others’ later study on applicants with past low-level
convictions came to the same conclusion.206 Referring to the efficacy
of in-person contact for applicants with records generally, he noted,
“[j]obseekers who make direct contact are thus much more likely to
be called back by employers who may wish to provide a ‘second
chance’ to an otherwise promising applicant.”207 But in instances
where employers use categorical exclusion and shifting standards to
make decisions about applicants of color, even in-person interviews
are unlikely to have a significant affect. Further, black applicants
generally have far less access to face-time with hiring authorities than
whites.208
The sociological research conducted on this issue up until now is
far from complete or definitive in regards to its reflection on ban-thebox legislation specifically. But the empirical data gathered so far
makes clear the necessity to allocate attention and resources to
monitor how ban-the-box laws will impact people of color with
records in particular. The research shows that race remains highly
salient in employers’ evaluations of workers, consistently expressed
through a conflation of race and criminality in hiring decisions.209
Therefore, failing to remain race-conscious in this new legal arena
could come at the expense of those who fought to have these laws
enacted to protect them.

205. See id. at App. Table A1; see infra App. A. Still, this research was not
definitive and, further, the recorded advantage of personal contact for blacks was not
as significant as that of whites.
206. Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the
Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 643
(2014) (“personal contact is an especially powerful [hiring] predictor for African
American applicants”).
207. Id. at 631 (citing Pager, Western & Bonikowski, supra note 197).
208. Id. Because black applicants receive call backs thirty percent less frequently
than whites, they more rarely make it to the stages in hiring when they can speak to
an employer face to face. Id. at 631.
209. This theory is challenged by a study of the Hawaii ban-the-box law in 2014.
Although the study was not specifically measuring the effect of the ban-the-box law
on the employment prospects of black job applicants, the results showed that “repeat
offending dropped precipitously among both blacks and non-blacks following the
implementation of Hawaii’s ban the box law,” and concluded that “the negative
impact of the law on the employment prospects of black job applicants would
probably be minimal at best.” Stewart J. D’Alessio, Lisa Stolzenberg & Jamie L.
Flexon, The Effect of Hawaii’s Ban the Box Law on Repeat Offending , 40 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 336, 349 (2014).
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Another sociological framework that can be used to consider how
ban-the-box laws will impact racial minorities is an established theory
behind organizations’ responses to employment discrimination
legislation. According to a seminal article in this field by Lauren
Edelman, because equal employment opportunity laws tend to set
forth broad and ambiguous principles, organizations (or employers)
receive and manipulate wide latitude to construct the meaning of
compliance in ways that meet legal demands but preserve managerial
interests.210 In particular, Edelman identifies ambiguity in respect to
compliance with equal employment opportunity laws as a source of
their vulnerability to manipulation.211 In response to pressure to
ameliorate discrimination, organizations take advantage of these
areas of vulnerability by creating formal structures that act as visible
symbols of their attention to the law, while preserving their
managerial discretion.212 In light of this tendency, ban-the-box laws
are particularly at risk of manipulation, especially because of their
varied and broad language.213
Thus, identifying the racial
considerations motivating enforcement will aid in ensuring that
organizations do not engage in purely cosmetic structural
reorientation in order to appear to be less discriminatory, while still
making criminal history prejudice-based decisions.
Using Edelman’s institutional theory, Christopher Uggen, Sarah E.
Lageson, and Mike Vuolo conducted a recent study using field data to
examine how employers navigate legal ambiguity and construct
compliance in making decisions about applicants with low-level
criminal histories in the rapidly changing legal environment.214 They
found that applicants with low-level criminal histories were more
210. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1531-32 (1992).

Using previous sociological research, Edelman argues that those responsible for
formulating, interpreting, and enforcing social reform laws are part of the dominant
class, and use their authority to construct law in a way that preserves the status quo
while giving the appearance of change. Pointing to failures in equal employment
opportunity law specifically, she argues that organizations, rather than resist law
overtly, are motivated by weaknesses and the mechanics of the legal process to
construct law in a manner that is minimally disruptive to the status quo and to create
institutional forms of compliance that maximize their own interests.
211. Id. at 1536. Edelman also identifies courts’ standard interpretation that the
laws constrain organizational procedures more than the outcomes of those
procedures and weak enforcement measures as the two other main areas of
vulnerability in equal employment opportunity laws. Id. at 1538-41.
212. Id. at 1542.
213. See supra Section II.A.4.
214. Sarah Esther Lageson, Mike Vuolo & Christopher Uggen, Legal Ambiguity in
Managerial Assessments of Criminal Records, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 175 (2015).
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likely to find employment in a workplace that has formally assessed
the risks and legalities associated with hiring an applicant with a
record, as opposed to a firm where hiring managers make largely
subjective hiring decisions and personally carry the burden of
liability.215 Therefore, when allowed high levels of discretion, most
employers used that discretionary power to protect themselves in
their hiring decisions.216 In their assessment, Uggen, Lageson, and
Vuolo evaluated the formal requirements and limitations of the 2012
EEOC enforcement guidance,217 but their determination is also
applicable to ban-the-box legislation—in order to increase
enforcement, specificity in procedural compliance is essential.
Outcome-based sociological studies show that, although the banthe-box movement and legislation is the next step in protecting
persons with criminal records, and particularly persons of color with
criminal records, the history and context of how the laws were made
may make them insufficient to solve the problem of race and criminal
record-based discrimination or may actually exacerbate such
discrimination. The studies suggest that the laws can be improved by
specifying race conscious compliance measures that do not
categorically exclude criminal background checks, but that mandate
the employer to use them specifically to dissipate hardened racebased perceptions of color and criminality.

2.

Using Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Theory to
Consider Ban-the-Box Law

The studies conducted by Pager, Western, Uggen, and others can
be situated within a tradition of civil rights law criticism that is
particularly pertinent to the issue in question. Failures in civil rights
law, crystallized in the troubling legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education,218 have led legal scholars to reconsider the efficacy of
certain forms of the liberal legal model,219 particularly in response to
a conservative judicial trend to look more and more skeptically on

215. Id. at 196.
216. Id. Notably, this seems to contradict the findings of Stoll. See Stoll, supra note
133.
217. Lageson, Vuolo & Uggen, supra note 214, at 197.
218. The public school system is more segregated today than it was at the time of
the decision. See Emily Richmond, Schools are More Segregated Today Than During
the Late 1960s, ATLANTIC (June 11, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2012/06/schools-are-more-segregated-today-than-during-the-late1960s/258348/ [https://perma.cc/NW8L-RB6W].
219. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
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disparate impact’s founding principles.220 Contemporary work in this
canon recognizes that future legislation must respond to the political
context and the demonstrated social resistance to legal remedies for
discrimination.221 Progressive critics of civil rights legislation have
advocated for creative models that address structural racism by
challenging the conventional ways that laws create and solidify
patterns of meaning.222 These models reject an understanding of civil
rights law as solely a removal of state-sanctioned barriers to an
individual’s mobility—which leaves any remaining inequality a result
of the individual’s personal failure—and, instead, advocate for the
dismantling of the structures that create those barriers to begin
with.223
Against this backdrop, the ban-the-box movement marks a break
from traditional civil rights law because it operates on the assumption
that the criminal justice system manufacturers disadvantage. In this
way, protecting the category of people with records, rather than
minorities with records exclusively, aligns with the powerful transition
in critical legal theory that destabilizes the fixed idea of race as a
biological category and instead links race to ideas about the way
power structures define relationships and allocate resources.224
However, the critical race model does not preclude race visibility.225
Indeed, acknowledging that the population of people with records
does not comprise a category determined by skin color is not the
same thing as ignoring criminal records’ unequal impact on racial
minorities.
There are liberals who believe that the advancement of minority
groups comes only through social programs with “universal appeal”

220. In Ricci v. DeStefano, Justice Scalia argued that disparate impact law is in
deep tension with the Equal Protection Clause. In a concurrence that attracted wide
attention, he asserted that because “Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a
racial thumb on the scales [raising equal protection concerns] . . . . the war between
disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later.” 557 U.S. 557,
594-97 (2009). For further discussion on this trend, see William Gordon, The
Evolution of the Disparate Impact Theory of Title VII: A Hypothetical Case Study,
44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 529, 531 (2007); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact
Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 734 (2006); Michael J. Songer, Note,

Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the
Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 257-59 (2005).
221. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY (2002).
222. Id. at 35.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 35, 74 (citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is
Colorblind,” in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 260 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al., eds., 1995)).
225. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 221, at 14-32.
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that minimize or eliminate overt discussion of race. These civil rights
theorists argue that, so long as social programs and laws present as
government aid to blacks and other communities of color, popular
support for them will decline.226 Additionally, they claim that making
race a central issue compounds stereotypes and makes populations
particularly vulnerable to negative attention.227 Thus, according to
this vision of liberal integration, racial silence in political and legal
discourse is deemed necessary.228 This viewpoint adheres partially to
the rejection of biological essentialism by allowing individuals who
share political sympathies with the struggles of racialized groups
(regardless of whether they fall into the same diagnostic category) to
organize with minorities in support of reform.229 But removing race
from legislative language couples with the American social
governance practice of systematically hiding the minority experience
from view, exemplified by the Census’ flagrant tradition of
underreporting employment and poverty data for people of color by
erasing incarcerated populations from the data pool.230 Further, it
deprives communities of color of crucial ammunition for ensuring that
these laws do, in fact, help them.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the race neutrality of the banthe-box laws is that it reflects an amnesia on the part of legislators
about the origins of the remedy—as a reaction to failures in the
implementation of Title VII. Since its passage, the Supreme Court
has undermined the color-conscious premise of Title VII’s
antidiscrimination principle231 by systematically rejecting the
existence of structural racism.232 Formally, this has meant that the
federal courts have read societal race-neutrality not only as a social
goal, but also as a premise of the legislation.233 In an attempt to move
beyond the “issue” of race, the Court has put forward the belief that
Title VII is meant to protect against the racial animus of individual

226. Id. at 39-41.
227. Id. at 39.
228. Id. at 40.
229. Id. at 293 (“[O]ne of the pernicious effects of racism is that it often disables
those whose interests do converge with people of color from fighting the structure
that disempowers them too.”).
230. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and The
Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994).
231. The antidiscrimination principle has traditionally been interpreted to mean
that laws are designed to eliminate social and economic group privilege.
232. See supra Section II.A.1.
233. Culp, supra note 230.
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employers operating within a just, un-stratified society, a fallacy that
is not just legally impotent but also harmful.234 Indeed, if nothing
else, the work of sociologists like Pager shows us that being marked
with a criminal record while black is fundamentally different from
being marked with a criminal record while white. The federal courts’
“mythologies” of colorblindness work to maintain the status quo
rather than implement change.235 Therefore, supplementing this
legacy with race-neutral policy is to surrender to its assumptions and,
ultimately, to the impossibility of the law’s capacity to improve the
social and economic condition of racial minorities. We need an
effective ban-the-box program that ensures and promotes race
conscious policy.
This last point is fundamentally political and informed by the work
of Harvard law professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres in The
Miner’s Canary.236 The book is at the nexus of critical race theory
and critical legal study, explaining how patterns that converge around
race are often markers of systemic injustice that affects the
underclass.237 According to the authors, race is a miner’s canary—this
metaphor refers to an old miner’s practice of carrying canaries with
them into the mines because the birds’ more fragile respiratory
systems would cause their lungs to collapse from toxic gases before
they affected humans, signaling danger.238 Guinier and Torres call for
a “political race project,”239 to create an activist agenda founded on
the principle of visibility.240 They argue that a colorblind approach to
deeply entrenched social problems does not work; it only inhibits
democratic engagement and reinforces existing power structures by
managing the appearance of formal equality without considering the
234. See supra Section II.A.1.
235. See Culp, supra note 230, at 176, 180 (premised on the confusion between
colorblindness and the antidiscrimination principle). See also Jerome McCristal Culp
Jr., Neutrality, The Race Question and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The Impossibility
of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 978 (1993) (“Title VII can be
effective in altering the economic position of black Americans, but its effectiveness is
tied to the interpretation of that law by federal judges.”).
236. While I support the arguments of this work and feel that they map on to my
discussion of ban-the-box legislation, Guinier and Torres are themselves extremely
wary of investing energy in law reform and actively aware of its limitations. See
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 221, at 17.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 11.
239. The “political race project” is a term developed by Guinier and Torres,
informed by the visionary powers of magical realism. It is used in their work to
“change the framework of the conversation about race by naming relationships to
power within the context of our racial and political history.” Id. at 15.
240. Id. at 14-32.
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consequences of real-world inequity and how the distribution of
resources in society is racialized.241 Guinier and Torres show that this
effort is distinct from past models—where conventional ideas of race
were deliberately tied to issues of social policy “in order to make
programs of general concern sound like special pleading”—instead,
their movement encourages recognition of racialization as a source of
power.242
The political race project encourages legislators to acknowledge
that the destructive market forces created by unemployment that rally
political will for new ban-the-box laws are not set in motion by
criminal record employment discrimination generally. Rather, they
are specifically brought about by racialized criminal record
employment discrimination and the breakdown it points to in the
country’s social fabric.
Political race project methodology is
conducted in a two-step process.243 The first step—and the one called
for in this Note to assess the impact of ban-the-box laws—is an
engagement with the racial alert signal that emerges from a social
problem.244 Only in the second step do advocates move beyond the
diagnostic tool of the canary.245 There, the problem is considered in
context, with an “expansive interpretation” based on more than racial
factors and more than just the costs and benefits of a given social
program.246 For ban-the-box, this means using the political energy
focused on ending criminal record discrimination as an advancement
of the racial civil rights agenda to eventually spark new conversations
about the injustices in the so-called criminal justice system. In this
way, Guinier and Torres offer a sound structural solution to a
structural problem.247 While the writers do not argue for a legislative
application of their methodology, in regards to ban-the-box laws, the
two steps could connect the prejudice felt by people of color with
records to the language of a societal remedy with the power to
recharacterize criminality generally and address its role in democratic
and economic failures that affect all Americans.248 The potential uses
for these politics are profound—like using ban-the-box legislation to

241. Id. at 38.
242. Id. at 302.
243. Id. at 274.
244. Id. at 274-75. For Guinier and Torres this engagement is not a legislative one,
but one of grassroots organizing.
245. Id. at 276.
246. Id.
247. Id. Guinier and Torres also outline a third step—action. See id. at 280.
248. Id. at 280.
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marshal resistance to building new prisons, connecting attempts to
reduce collateral and direct consequences to their source.
In sum, the ban-the-box movement demonstrates why criminal
record discrimination is not incidentally race-related but, rather,
situated within societal structures that reinforce oppression on the
front and back end of criminal justice involvement. At this relatively
nascent stage of the laws, it is necessary to consider who is being
erased by their language and how we might better orient these laws
with a successful political tradition, if not a successful legislative one.
The field of sociology lends important theories and strategies to
approach this question by pointing to the signals of compounded
racial and criminal history bias. As the success of the laws is assessed
going forward, race consciousness is necessary for the political and
legal efficacy of reentry.
III. THE FAILURES OF EXISTING DATA ON BAN-THE-BOX
This Part presents the empirical evaluations of the ban-the-box
laws that government bodies and interested advocacy groups have
conducted so far. Half of the data is the result of Freedom of
Information Law/Act (“FOIL” and “FOIA”) requests, while the rest
have been published. These studies are insufficient in both content
and scope, and very little can be drawn from their conclusions beyond
the necessity for more information. This Part concludes by proposing
that future ban-the-box laws promote data-collection systems
modeled after the one used in San Francisco. It also suggests ways in
which the ban-the-box laws can be written to be more race conscious
by incorporating “Purpose” sections into the laws.
A. Ban-the-Box Data from Minneapolis, Durham, San Francisco,
and New York City
To date, the findings drawn from the assessments of ban-the-box
laws have been extremely positive.
While these studies are
encouraging, their results must be couched in a recognition of the
limitations of this data collection so far and, specifically, of what has
yet to be measured. No evaluation was working with baseline data to
demonstrate the climate of ex-offender hiring locally before the
relevant ban-the-box law was implemented, and few measured
changes over time, so it is impossible to determine from the research
alone the impact of the legislation. Further, only the 2011 New York
City executive order, which is no longer in effect, implemented race
data collection to monitor the effect of the law on people of color
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with records.249
The studies raise questions about collection
enforcement, the biased interests of the collectors themselves, and
hidden or unmeasured variables. Findings from studies conducted in
Minneapolis, Durham, San Francisco, and New York City are
presented below, in one place, to begin to look critically at what (and
how much) is missing and to scrutinize the information that has been
collected so far. Each of the studies below have components that
could inform a more effective future law that would impose stricter
and more rigorous data collection for successful monitoring.

1.

Minneapolis, MN

Minneapolis implemented its ban-the-box legislation, the Fair
Hiring Practices Resolution, in December of 2006 for public
employers and in compliance with the EEOC’s recommended
criteria.250 The scope of this resolution expanded in stages. In 2007
the city removed the box on employment application materials asking
about criminal history and then, in January of 2008, a revised
background check policy went into effect. The revision included
stricter criteria for which positions required a background check and
also mandated that the check be conducted only after a conditional
offer was made.251 In July of 2008, the city’s Human Resources
Department conducted a study measuring changes in background
check practices following the implementation of the legislation.
The findings of this study were presented in a public letter from
City Council Member Elizabeth Glidden, who co-authored the
resolution. Glidden wrote in the letter: “Today I confirm that, based
on two years of results, this decision [to ban the box] has benefitted
city government and residents with a criminal background.”252 The
report shows that the number of background checks conducted

249. See infra Section III.A.4.
250. Glidden & Samuels, Resolution of the City of Minneapolis, NELP (2006),
http://nelp.3cdn.net/0444827b7bdbf6acb2_o5m6bxsl0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/985E8X65]. Interestingly, Minneapolis is one of the only ban-the-box legislations to
mention in its actual language the disproportionate impact of criminal record
discrimination on people of color: “WHEREAS people of color are arrested,
convicted, and incarcerated in numbers disproportionate to their representation in
the population, which disproportionately impacts their families and communities.” Id.
It is also important to recognize that a resolution, unlike an ordinance, is not binding
law. Instead, resolutions are generally used to provide policy direction, to set or
amend operating policies and procedures, and to memorialize administrative actions.
251. NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 19.
252. Letter from Elizabeth Glidden, City Council Member, to Mee Moua, St.
Senator (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Glidden-LtrMinneapolis2004-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBH8-SH63].
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compared to the total number of applications dropped by only 1.5
percent but that the number of applicants with past convictions hired
compared to the total number of applicants who were flagged to have
criminal histories or “concerns” increased by more than fifty
percent.253 However, although the fraction of reviewed criminal
histories leading to jobs increased since the resolution was passed, the
number of people who were hired after their criminal histories were
reviewed (“# of Applicants with Concerns Hired”) compared to the
total number of applications (“Applications Received”) actually
decreased from 0.3 percent to 0.2 percent.254 It is possible that this
difference is due to the fact that fewer applicants had records, but that
would seem unlikely given the increased incentive to apply provided
by the new ban-the-box policy. Therefore, the resolution seems to
effectively restrict how public employers analyze criminal background
checks but, ultimately, people with criminal records appear to have
still faced discrimination by other, unmeasured means.

2.

Durham City and County, NC

In 2014 the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, a nonprofit that
aims to dismantle structural racism and oppression, published a
report of a case study of Durham City and County’s ban-the-box
legislations.255 In 2011 and 2012, respectively, Durham City256 and
Durham County257 passed administrative policies that, like
Minneapolis, applied to public employment and require both that the
question about criminal history be removed from initial stages of the
employment process and that the record check occur only after a
conditional offer is made.258 The administrative policies also restrict
which individuals in the City and County’s human resources
departments can conduct a background check, in order to limit the
number of people who come in contact with an individual’s record.259
253. See infra App. B.
254. See infra App. B.
255. S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUST., THE BENEFITS OF BAN THE BOX: A CASE STUDY OF
DURHAM, NC (2014), http://www.southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/
BantheBox_WhitePaper-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MUT-SG4D].
256. ALETHEA BELL, CITY OF DURHAM, N.C., BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS
POLICY (Apr. 18, 2011), http://nelp.3cdn.net/2d995ad9f9d9a25923_wam6i22rt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S69V-Y7Z8].
257. CTY. OF DURHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS IN THE RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS
(2012), http://nelp.3cdn.net/b1b8b051fc035c4153_3qm6b5isg.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8L68-BDMZ].
258. NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 31, 39.
259. Id.
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Applicants who are found to have records with a potential for adverse
employment action are given seven days to challenge the record or
present evidence of rehabilitation, and employers must use a
balancing test—which takes into account the nature of the offense,
time passed, and the relationship between the offense and the
prospective job—in order to make a final decision.260
According to the report, since the ban-the-box initiative began in
2011, the overall proportion of people with criminal records hired by
the City of Durham increased by nearly sevenfold.261 In Durham
County ninety-six percent of the applicants with criminal records who
were recommended for hire prior to the background check were
ultimately hired.262 Further, at the time the report was published,
none of the people with criminal records who were hired by the
county had since been recorded as terminated because of illegal
conduct.263
The Durham data is interesting compared to that of Minneapolis
because, while the requirements of the laws are nearly identical,264
where Durham saw an increase in hires of people with records,
Minneapolis saw only a reduction in discrimination based on the
outcome of the criminal background checks. This may be due to
distinctions in geographic bias, but it could also be due to variance in
advocacy and awareness efforts. Again, further details and data are
necessary to draw a firm conclusion from this discrepancy.

3.

San Francisco, CA

As noted above, in 2014 San Francisco passed the Fair Chance
Ordinance (“FCO”), which applies to both public and private
employers.265 The FCO prohibits employers from asking about an
applicant’s criminal history until after the first in-person interview.
Its language incorporates the EEOC criteria about individualized
assessment and provides a right for applicants to receive a copy of any
background report and to appeal denial of employment.266 The

260. Id.
261. See infra App. C; see also S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUST., supra note 255, at 6.
262. See infra App. C.
263. See infra App. C. Problematically, the collection means and source of this
data are not specified in the study.
264. Except that the Minneapolis law evolved in stages, unlike the Durham law.
This could potentially also influence the different impacts of the laws.
265. See NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 16-17.
266. S.F. POLICE CODE, ARTICLE 49: PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING ARRESTS
AND CONVICTION INFORMATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING DECISIONS (July 11,
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ordinance also includes a specific provision regarding applications for
affordable housing.267 San Francisco charges the Office of Labor
Standards Enforcement (“OLSE”) with surveying San Francisco
employers and, significantly, the FCO specifically mandates annual
data collection by the OLSE to ensure compliance.268
The OLSE collected ban-the-box data in 2015 in an annual survey
that was originally designed to monitor the city’s Health Care
Security Ordinance because the laws cover nearly identical employer
populations.269 The survey designated six questions to determine the
impact of the FCO during the period between August 13 and
December 31 of 2014, addressing number of total hires, content of job
applications, background checks, prohibited topics, changes made for
compliance, and total hires with conviction histories.270 During 2014,
private employers in San Francisco were under an implementation or
“education period” when the OLSE was not authorized to impose
any penalties for failure to comply, so the employers had little
incentive to provide inaccurate information.271
The survey recorded responses from 4732 employers ranging from
local, small businesses with twenty employees to very large companies
with over 500 employees (representing twenty-eight percent of the
responses), from non-profit organizations (352 employers) to forprofit businesses. In total, the reporting employers recorded hiring
68,667 employees during the measured period. Nearly eighteen
percent of respondents reported violating the requirement about
removing the conviction question from application materials and

2014),
http://sf-hrc.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%2049_%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2M3-TWME].
267. Id.
268. Id.
(a) An Employer shall retain records of employment, application forms, and
other pertinent data and records required under this Article, for a period of
three years, and shall allow the OLSE access to such records, with
appropriate notice and at a mutually agreeable time, to monitor compliance
with the requirements of this Article.
(b) An Employer shall provide information to the OLSE, or the OLSE’s
designee, on an annual basis as may be required to verify the Employer’s
compliance with this Article.

Id.
269. REP. TO THE BD. OF SUPERVISORS, FAIR CHANCE HIRING IN SAN FRANCISCO:
YEAR ONE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO FAIR CHANCE ORDINANCE (Jan. 29 2016),
http://sfgov.org/olse/sites/default/files/FCO%20First%20Year%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5W7V-84Q6].
270. Id.
271. Id.
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communications before the in-person interview, although some may
have been in “exempt” industries, and seven percent did not
respond.272
In contrast, almost ninety percent of the survey
respondents reported not conducting a background check until after
an in-person interview with almost identical results for the question
asking about whether the employer avoided prohibited topics
including arrests, expunged convictions, outdated convictions, etc.273
Another question asked respondents whether they had changed their
job application materials and process to comply with the FCO.
About eighteen percent (851) of employers said that they changed
their application process, while over fifty-one percent recorded
already being in compliance and over fifteen percent claimed never to
have checked conviction history.274 Finally, only three percent of
employers recorded hiring anyone with a conviction history in 2014,
with thirty-eight percent definitively answering that they had not
hired any people with past convictions and fifty-three percent
reporting that they did not know.275 Of the 398 employees with
conviction histories hired, 345 were hired by for-profit companies and
fifty-three were hired by nonprofit organizations.
Looking more closely at those employers who hired workers with
conviction histories, most reported hiring only one such employee.276
Goodwill Industries was the highest employer of people with records
at forty-one employees (out of 1999 total hires).277 Target and CorO-Van Moving had the second highest employment counts for people
with records at fifteen and sixteen people, respectively.278

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. See also infra App. D. The answers to this question are influenced by
employers’ confusion about how to respond if other laws preempted them from
removing conviction questions from their materials. The FCO contains a preemption
clause and the OLSE reported that during survey process several employers called to
report that because of “preemption issues” they had not changed their application or
background check process. OLSE advised those callers to respond that their
application was compliant. However, because the survey did not offer guidance
about how to answer the question in regards to preemption, “it cannot be determined
what option other employers with preemption issues chose for their response.” The
OLSE plans to change this question to ask about preemption specifically in future
surveys.
275. See infra App. E. The response “I don’t know” may indicate that the
employer did not inquire into conviction histories at all and therefore was not able to
answer the question. REP. TO THE BD. OF SUPERVISORS, supra note 269.
276. S.F. Off. of Lab. Standards Enf’t, Fair Chance Act Data 2005 (unpublished
report) (on file with author).
277. Id.
278. Id.
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Interestingly, the majority of businesses that recorded hiring more
than two people with criminal records (including the three employers
hiring the largest number of ex-offenders) were also those who had
reported changing their practices to comply with the law.279 This
suggests that the act of engaging with the language of the law might
have an impact on how it is implemented by employers.

4.

New York, NY

Before New York City implemented the Fair Chance Act in June
of 2015, which applies to public and private employers, the city’s first
ban-the-box law was Executive Order 151, passed in 2011 by thenMayor Michael Bloomberg. The order was part of Bloomberg’s
Young Men’s Initiative (“YMI”), a campaign to “improve the lives of
young black and Latino men in New York City.”280 Executive Order
151 covered only public employers and served as a supplement to the
failed enforcement of Article 23-A of New York Corrections Law.281
Under 23-A, a candidate may only be denied employment if the
conviction history is directly related to the job or poses an
unreasonable risk based on certain factors, such as the time passed
since the offense, or its severity.282 Beyond executing the provisions
of 23-A, Executive Order 151 prohibited employers from asking
applicants about conviction histories on any preliminary employment
application documents and before or during the first job interview.
While the remodeled Fair Chance Act of 2015 has no provision for
data collection,283 the Executive Order charged the NYC Department
of Citywide Administrative Services’ (“DCAS”) Human Capital
Division with monitoring the effects of the law for two years and
conducting “periodic operational reviews of agency practices.”284 The
data that DCAS collected was never published.285

279. Id.
280. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Citywide Admin. Servs., Executive Order 151 Data 2012
(unpublished report) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2012 Executive Order 151
Data].
281. Michael R. Bloomberg, Executive Order 151, Consideration of Criminal
Convictions in Hiring, NELP (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.nelp.org/content/
uploads/2015/03/NewYorkExecutiveOrder151.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCP2-N7P8].
282. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753 (McKinney 2007) (listing eight statutory factors for
employers to consider regarding an applicant’s conviction history).
283. See N.Y.C. Council, New York City Fair Chance Act Int. No. 318-A, NELP
(June 10, 2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fair-Chance-Act-NYC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7NU-BN5U].
284. See Bloomberg, supra note 281.
285. 2012 Executive Order 151 Data, supra note 280.
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During the two-year monitoring period (2012 and 2013) an average
of 51.9 percent of the thirty reporting New York City agencies (out of
thirty-six total) hired people with criminal records.286 In 2012, 49.1
percent of the thirty agencies hired ex-offenders, while the number
jumped to 55.2 percent in 2013.287 Of those agencies that recorded
hiring ex-offenders, people with records made up twelve percent of
total hires in 2012 and twenty-four percent of total hires in 2014.288
Although not mentioned in the report, these numbers may be high
due to jobs added in public “non-competitive” fields in conjunction
with the YMI that were, on the one hand, particularly suited to
individuals with limited employment experience and skills and, on the
other hand, nonpermanent. The job titles with the highest hiring
rates of individuals included “per diem job training participants” (59.4
percent of the total hires for 2012 and 64.3 percent of the total hires for
2013)289 and “lifeguard” (2.0 percent of total hires in 2012 and 2.1
percent in 2013).290 While these positions may be easier to get with
minimal qualifications, they also appear to be temporary or seasonal.
Other seemingly nonpermanent jobs with high hiring rates included
“city seasonal worker” and “city seasonal aide.”291
The data from the New York City Executive Order 151 is unique
because it did measure race and ethnic composition of the hired
individuals with records.292 In 2012 60.4 percent of total hires with
records were reported to be black and 15.7 percent were Hispanic; in
2013, 67.7 percent of total hires with records were black and 17.6
percent were Hispanic.293 These numbers are so high, and so
dramatically inconsistent with studies like Pager’s, that the reporting
measures and data variables used must be called into question.
However, the study’s outlier findings may be due to the particular
orientation of Executive Order 151 and its specific goal to improve
lives of black and Latino men. Still, it is also necessary to position

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Problematically, “per diem job training participant” is not defined in any of
the City’s materials and is nowhere listed as a New York City job.
290. 2012 Executive Order 151 Data, supra note 280.
291. Id.
292. The New York law is one of the laws that has expressly designated racial
discrimination as a purpose for implementing the ban-the-box law. This factor makes
the new law extremely viable and useful for determining whether race consciousness
can affect the racial makeup of employees with records who are hired as a result of
the law. See discussion, supra note 178.
293. See infra App. F.
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Executive Order 151 within a criminal justice regime under Mayor
Michael Bloomberg that boasted some of the city’s highest recidivism
rates in history and such flagrant racial profiling in policing practices
that they were found to violate the constitutional rights of New
Yorkers of color.294 As the data stands—with insufficient background
information and in a particularly racially hostile political context—it
is difficult to give it much credence. In particular, in order to analyze
the study more effectively, it would be necessary to have additional
details about who was getting allocated “temporary” or “provisional”
positions versus permanent employment. It is important to note that
the New York City Fair Chance Act of 2015 is more substantive,
lasting, and enforceable than Executive Order 151, as well as also
applying to private employers; on top of that, its explicit purpose
includes ameliorating the racial disparity in criminal record hiring
discrimination.295

5.

Summary

Together, these data collection efforts demonstrate that a wide
span of information about the effects of ban-the-box laws can be
collected through simple surveys of employers about their hiring
practices. While these efforts are insufficient individually, each study
provides useful material for considering the importance of data
collection and what still needs to be measured. Even the uncertainty
reflected in employers’ responses to the San Francisco survey
questions is helpful, by signaling the need for improvement in
outreach and awareness campaigns to better prepare the labor market
when rolling out new legislation. Further, the studies reflect a
malleability in employer hiring practices that challenges the
underlying principle of stasis in the sociological theory about
organizations’ responses to employment discrimination legislation.
Each study revealed different degrees of willingness by employers to
adjust their hiring procedures to meet the requirements of ban-thebox legislation. The New York data even raises the potential that
294. See Adam Peck, Mayor Bloomberg: NYPD ‘Stops Whites Too Much and
Minorities Too Little,’ THINK PROGRESS (June 28, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/

justice/2013/06/28/2231761/mayor-bloomberg-nypd-stop-whites-too-much-andminorities-too-little/ [https://perma.cc/67L7-TP9C]; see also Floyd v. City of New
York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the NYPD’s practices
violated New Yorkers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and also finding that the practices were racially discriminatory
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). To
remedy the widespread constitutional violations, the judge ordered a court-appointed
monitor to oversee a series of reforms to NYPD policing practices.
295. See discussion, supra note 292.
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legislation could be race specific. What’s more, the findings of the
San Francisco survey suggest that the process of reconsidering hiring
practices through engagement with legislation can itself be a powerful
motivating factor in implementing change. That said, there are
already signs of cosmetic compliance—for instance, in New York
agencies’ relegation of ex-offenders to temporary labor positions. It
is clear that additional and more comprehensive data collection is
essential to determining the real sources of change in employer hiring
in order to better direct that change with future legislation.
In total, these data collection efforts are conspicuously limited and
infrequent. All the studies show the potential for the laws to have a
real impact on the hiring practices of employers in their consideration
of applicants’ criminal histories, but none have taken the further step
of exploring the nature of this impact and identifying the individuals
that benefit from it. In particular, the data is subject to the empirical
pitfall of “omitted variable bias” because it fails to determine the
experience of people of color with records in the new hiring arena
(with the exception of the unreliable New York data) and how that
invisible factor changes the results of the laws’ implementations.296
Going forward, the laws should mandate data collection (like in San
Francisco) by an equipped government body and measure not only
the hiring rates of people with records generally, but, rather, the
specific demographic makeup of those hires.
B.

A Proposal

First, it is important to note that calling for race data collection is a
policy not free from its own problematic context. Such data
collection has been viewed in multiple instances as a suspect practice,
in violation of the antidiscrimination principle.297 Most recently, the
contemporary civil rights movement has called attention to the use of
race data to enforce criminal justice policies (e.g., “driving while

296. ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN,
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 324-25 (2010) (“Omitted variable bias arises when
there is an explanatory or independent variable that has an influence on the
dependent variable but has not been explicitly included as an independent variable
and that is correlated with one or more of the independent variables that is or are
included. When it occurs, the estimates for the patterns of the included variables that
are correlated with the omitted variable may be biased . . . . [Omitted variable bias
could] cause an included variable to be credited with an effect that actually is caused
by the excluded variable.” (emphasis added)). Even carefully designed studies suffer
from omitted variable bias, but this particular omitted variable is especially at risk of
having serious consequences on the conclusions of the studies.
297. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 941-42 (2006).

1210

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

black” or “flying while brown”), as well as its use by the Census
Bureau.298 In light of that critique, the mode of data collection called
for in this Note is intended to fit the category of research that
measures a racial phenomenon, rather than constructing one.
Second, empirical data alone cannot provide a complete picture of the
impact of ban-the-box legislation on racial minorities with records.
Understanding how employers make decisions and participate in the
construction of prejudice requires qualitative and theoretical study,
too. Still, empirics are useful for the overall analysis of this Note,
because they encourage visibility by measuring the links between
social phenomena that, while structurally present, are often hidden.
Additional questions about potential issues with the
implementation of data collection still remain. Who is best positioned
to collect the data? Who will enforce that collection? Also, the most
effective use of this data by claimants and courts remains to be
determined.
This Note proposes that future ban-the-box laws require data
collection, following in the model of the San Francisco FCO.299 The
data should directly address the races of ex-offenders who are hired in
order to determine if minorities are benefiting from the
implementation of ban-the-box laws. This collection should be at
least annual and conducted by a relevant and competent government
office or agency, either in conjunction with an enforcement body or
with the power to enforce the laws itself. The purpose of this data
collection should be transparently conveyed in order to reinforce to
employers the goals of the laws and how assessments relate to those
goals.
In order to facilitate and regulate the retrieval and
measurement of empirical material by a variety of officials across the
country, the EEOC should issue guidance recommending and
demonstrating successful data collection.300 Finally, and perhaps most
298. Id. at 942.
299. The relevant section of the San Francisco ordinance reads as follows:
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under this Article, the OLSE shall
adopt rules that establish procedures for Employers to maintain and retain
accurate records and to provide annual reporting of compliance to OLSE in
a manner that does not require disclosure of any information that would
violate State or Federal privacy laws.
S.F. POLICE CODE, supra note 266.
300. The EEOC could also collect the data itself. Recently, the EEOC issued a
proposal to amend the Employer Information Report (“EEO-1”) for all employers
with more than one hundred employees to “include collecting pay data from
employers.” U.S. EEOC, Press Release, EEOC Announces Proposed Addition of
Pay Data to Annual EE-1 Reports (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/release/1-29-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/K6H4-43LK].
EEO-1 data
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importantly, ban-the-box laws should be written to be more race
conscious by incorporating “Purpose” sections that address the
disparate treatment of people of color by the criminal justice system
and then by employers post-conviction. This will guide employers to
conceive of compliance with ban-the-box laws in a way that reflects
the true purpose of the legislation: ameliorating structural inequality
and prejudice in the labor market.
CONCLUSION
The racially discriminatory practices of the criminal justice system
have facilitated structural inequality in the labor market through the
negative credential of the criminal record. Thus far, efforts to use
Title VII to ameliorate this problem have been disempowered by the
federal courts’ skepticism of the persistence of race as source of social
and economic disadvantage in America. This legislative and judicial
failure, the rise of the criminal background check industry, and
compounded racial prejudice about criminality have led to a national
effort to advance ban-the-box laws. As the country rallies behind
these new laws, it is necessary to improve their efficacy by considering
their legal legacy and implementing race-conscious legislation.
The laws going forward should mandate data collection about the
race of hires with criminal histories. They should also include
“Purpose” sections that address the issue of employers’ disparate
treatment of racial minorities with records as a result of structural
inequality perpetuated by the criminal justice system. Ban-the-box
laws are the product of a movement that has seen the miner’s canary
struggling to breathe; now is not the time to shut our eyes.

provides the federal government with workforce profiles from private sector federal
employers by race, ethnicity, sex, and job category. The January 2016 proposal, while
specifically addressing wages, signifies the EEOC’s recognition of empirical data as a
successful means to spot “trends” in discrimination. If the EEOC measured the
hiring rates of ex-offenders and their races it would create a substantial amount of
data for activists and legislators working on ban-the-box laws.
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APPENDIX B302
2004-2006

2007-July 3, 2008

Applications Received-City Positions
Only

Applicant Summary

18,842

12,911

# of Background Checks Conducted303

996 (5.3% of total
applications)

494 (3.8% of total
applications)

N/A

47

# of Background Checks with
Convictions Concerns
% of Applicants with Conviction
Concerns304

9.5%

# of Applicants with Concerns Hired

57 (5.7%)305

27 (57.4%)

# of Applications Rejected Prior to an
Eligible List Being Established

51 (5.1%)

None306

# of Applicants Rejected for not
responding to a convictions letter

41 (4.1%)

1 (2.1%)

# of Applicants rejected due to the
nature of the conviction (postcertification)307

2 (0.2%)

13 (27.7%)

302. City of Durham, supra note 257.
303. “2004-2006 reflects the number of applicant-disclosed convictions for
permanent hires, not the number of background checks conducted through a thirdparty vendor. 2007-2008 reflects the number of background checks conducted
through a third-party vendor for all applicable details, temporary and permanent
hires.” Letter from Elisabeth Glidden, supra note 252, at 3 n.1.
304. “For 2004-2006, all disclosed conviction information was reviewed. There is
no specific data available for how many of those disclosures had ‘concerns.’” Id. at 3
n.2.
305. “Percentages are the ratio of applicant status to the number of background
checks conducted (2004-2007), or the number of checks with concerns (2007-2008).”
Id. at 3 n.3.
306. “As of 1/30/07, background checks [were] only conducted after a conditional
job offer had been made.” Id. at 3 n.4.
307. “2004-2006 numbers are lower as rejections were typically done prior to
certification. 2007-2008 rejection percentages are higher as it is compared only to the
number of checks with a concern (47).” Id. at 3 n.5.
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APPENDIX C308

Percentage By Public Employers in Durham City,
NC of New Hires With Criminal Records From
2011-2014
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APPENDIX D309
Did you change your job application process
to comply with the FCO? (Multiple options)
Yes, we changed our application and /or
background check process

Number of
Responses

Percentage

845

17.9%

2,432

51.4%

No, we never considered arrest records or
convictions, and we still do not

728

15.4%

No, we have not yet changed out process to
comply with the law

99

2.0%

No our existing application and/or
background check process was already
compliant with the law

Total:

4,104*

Note: Due to a technical problem, 628 online surveys had no usable data in
response to Question 5.

308. S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUST., supra note 255.
309. REP. TO THE BD. OF SUPERVISORS, supra note 269.
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APPENDIX E310
Did you hire anyone with a conviction history between August
13, 2014 and December 31, 2014?
Yes

135

3%

No

1,776

38%

Don’t know

2,490

53%

331

7%

No response
Total:

4,732

APPENDIX F311
Recorded in the Citywide Administrative Services Report on
Citywide Diversity and Equal Employment Opportunity

Race/Ethnicity Composition of Hired Indviduals With
Conviction Records in 2012 and 2013
70
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310. Id.
311. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Citywide Admin. Servs., supra note 280.
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